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PROTECTING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
THROUGH THE VOTER QUALIFICATIONS 
CLAUSE OF ARTICLE I 
FRANITA TOLSON* 
Abstract: The Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution makes federal voting rights dependent upon participation in state 
elections. This Article argues that the right to vote in federal elections, as defined 
by Article I, incorporates both i) state constitutional law governing the right to 
vote and ii) the democratic norms that existed within the states at the founding as 
the basis for determining the qualifications of federal electors. The democratic 
norms governing political participation can be traced to founding-era state consti-
tutions that preserved the fundamental right of citizens to “alter or abolish” their 
governments at will, similar to the “right of revolution” exercised by the colo-
nists against the British during the Revolutionary War. It is this understanding of 
the right to vote in federal elections, parasitic upon the robustly democratic no-
tion of participation that existed at the state level and enshrined in state constitu-
tional “alter or abolish” provisions, that is protected by the Voter Qualifications 
Clause of Article I. Contrary to this provision, courts have divorced state and 
federal elections, resulting in excessive judicial deference to state regulations that 
govern the right to vote. As this Article demonstrates, the Voter Qualifications 
Clause requires that states aggressively safeguard political participation in order 
to protect federal voting rights, which in turn requires courts to apply a higher 
level of scrutiny when assessing the constitutionality of state election laws. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent political and legal debates over elections have focused on the au-
thority that states have under federal law and their respective state constitu-
tions to enact regulations that are more restrictive of voting rights than prior 
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practices.1 For example, several state legislatures have enacted strict voter 
identification laws on the grounds that such laws are necessary to combat the 
risk of in-person voter fraud, a claim that some courts and commentators have 
found to be insufficient to justify the burden on the right to vote.2 Other battles 
have focused on the constitutionality of documentary proof of citizenship and 
English proficiency requirements as prerequisites to voter registration.3 All of 
these disputes have centered on the scope and contours of the states’ authority 
to regulate access to the ballot, although it is widely assumed that states have 
broad authority in this area.4 
The caselaw regarding the states’ power to circumscribe voting rights is 
inconsistent, and much of the blame is due to the asymmetrical framework es-
tablished by the U.S. Supreme Court more than four decades ago. In a series of 
cases, the Court held that the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2 
of the U.S. Constitution confers a fundamental right to vote in federal elec-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Brittney Martin, Voter ID Woes Could Soar in Higher-Turnout Elections, Officials Fear, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 24, 2013, http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/headlines/20131124-
voter-id-woes-could-soar-in-higher-turnout-elections-officials-fear.ece, archived at http://perma.cc/
4HSU-DXNQ (discussing a 2011 Texas law requiring voters to present a government-issued form of 
identification); Evan Perez, Justice Department Sues North Carolina over Voting Law, CNN, Sept. 30, 
2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/30/us/north-carolina-voting-lawsuit/, archived at http://perma.cc/
WAF8-SCHZ (discussing a lawsuit filed by the Department of Justice challenging a new North Carolina 
law that, among other things, requires voters to have photo identification); see also Shelby Cnty. v. Hold-
er, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (invalidating section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which de-
termined the jurisdictions that had to pre-clear any changes to their election laws with the federal gov-
ernment before the changes could go into effect because of the jurisdiction’s history of racial discrimina-
tion in voting). 
 2 See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, No. 11-CV-01128, 2014 WL 1775432, at *32–33 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 
29, 2014) (invalidating Wisconsin’s voter identification law under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
which prohibits any law that has the purpose or effect of abridging the right to vote on the basis of 
race); Applewhite v. Pennsylvania, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *18, 26 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. Jan. 17, 2014) (permanently enjoining Pennsylvania’s voter identification law on state constitu-
tional grounds). 
 3 See Kobash v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1271 (D. Kan. 2014), rev’d, 
772 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2014) (upholding a proof of citizen requirement for voter registration in federal 
elections); see also Erik Eckholm, After Ruling, Alabama Joins Two States in Moving to Alter Voting 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2014, at A13; Kerry Dougherty, In Plain Language: Voters Should Know 
Their English, VA.-PILOT, Oct. 14, 2011, http://hamptonroads.com/2011/10/plain-language-voters-
should-know-their-english, archived at http://perma.cc/FJ8H-NQEC?type=pdf. 
 4 The Supreme Court recently held that, despite Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause 
to regulate the time, places, and manner of federal elections, states have primary authority over voter 
qualifications. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2263 (2013) [here-
inafter Arizona Inter Tribal] (observing that state control over voter qualifications is plenary, limited 
only by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments). Giv-
en this authority, states take different approaches to regulating the right to vote. See Wendy R. Weiser 
& Erik Opsal, The State of Voting in 2014, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (June 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/state-voting-2014, archived at http://perma.cc/X953-DKXE 
(stating that, since 2010, 22 states have passed new voting restrictions and 16 states have passed laws 
to improve the voting process). 
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tions.5 Yet the Court stopped short of according the same protection to the right 
to vote in state elections, even though Article I links state and federal political 
participation by requiring federal voters to “have the qualifications requisite 
for the electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.”6 In Har-
per v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Supreme Court opted instead to ground 
the right to vote in state elections in the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which permits the state to choose whether to extend the 
right to vote, but once available, the state must offer it on equal terms.7 The 
equal protection framework, modified in decisions subsequent to Harper to be 
more deferential to state authority,8 has come to dominate the assessment of all 
regulations governing the right to vote, regardless if the law applies to state 
elections, federal elections, or both.9 
Application of the current standard of review rarely leads to the invalida-
tion of restrictive voting laws because the Supreme Court does not place the 
onus on the state to justify them.10 Contrary to this approach, this Article con-
tends that the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I requires that states ag-
gressively protect political participation in order to safeguard federal voting 
                                                                                                                           
 5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members 
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have 
the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”); id. 
amend. XVII (similar requirement for senate elections); see Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663, 665 (1966) (stating that “the right to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. I, § 2, of the 
Constitution”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (holding that Art. I, § 2, of the Constitu-
tion “gives persons qualified to vote a constitutional right to vote and to have their votes counted”). 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.  
 7 See id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Harper, 383 U.S. at 665 (relying on 
the Equal Protection Clause because “the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly men-
tioned” in the Constitution); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 114 
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The right to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. I, § 2, and 
the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution, and access to the state franchise has been afforded 
special protection because it is ‘preservative of other basic civil and political rights.’” (quoting Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964))). 
 8 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (applying a balancing 
test, rather than strict scrutiny, to assess the burdens imposed on the right to vote by Indiana’s voter 
identification law that applied to both state and federal elections); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 
434 (1992) (same for Hawaii’s ballot access law). 
 9 Commentators have been critical of the equal protection framework. See Michael W. 
McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 103, 110 (2000) (“[I]t is clear—a word that can rarely be used in this field of law—that 
the Equal Protection Clause was not originally understood by its framers to encompass voting 
rights.”); Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 
50–55 (2004) (listing a number of reasons why “the conventional understanding of individual rights 
and equality cannot readily be transferred to the domain of democracy”). However, scholars have not 
acknowledged that much of its ill-fit has to do with the implicit assumption in cases, after Harper, that 
the substance of the right to vote in federal elections also derives from the Equal Protection Clause, 
thus compounding the problems with the framework. See infra notes 42–73 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 28–116 and accompanying text. 
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rights.11 Because Article I funnels all political participation through the aegis 
of the state, courts should be more attentive to state electoral rules and apply 
heightened scrutiny to all regulations governing the right to vote. Under 
heightened scrutiny, the Court would strike down restrictive regulations that 
are not supported by empirical evidence, or that do not directly respond to a 
problem in the state’s electoral system. 
Applying heightened scrutiny is more consistent with the constitutional 
text and history than the current approach because the original understanding 
of Article I was that political participation in federal elections would mimic the 
robust levels of participation that existed in the states.12 Historically, states 
have always had high levels of citizen involvement in elections and govern-
ance.13 This remains true, as the American people enjoy an explicit right to 
vote under 49 out of 50 state constitutions; directly elect almost all of their 
state officials; and participate in lawmaking through direct democracy in many 
states.14 This history reveals that the right to vote in state elections is best un-
derstood, not as an equal protection fundamental interest subject to retraction, 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 261–306 and accompanying text. 
 12 This Article makes several historical claims about the meaning of the Voter Qualifications 
Clause, but these claims should not be taken as advocating for an originalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation. Unlike originalists, I do not believe that “constitutional interpretation should be charac-
terized exclusively by an effort to determine the Constitution’s meaning by means of some form of 
historical inquiry.” Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy…No Problem: Original-
ism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (2012). Nonetheless, I do believe that 
the original understanding of a text (as evinced by the statements of the framers, the ratifiers, and the 
general public) remains an important constraint on judicial interpretations of the text’s meaning, but 
other factors also are important in determining the meaning of the text. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, 
LIVING ORIGINALISM 35 (2011) (arguing that constitutional law develops through “various construc-
tions, institutions, laws, and practices that have grown up around the text”); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity 
and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1993) (advocating for an interpretive approach 
known as “translation,” which requires courts to “locate a meaning [of the text] in an original context” 
and then “ask how that meaning is to be carried to a current context” in order to serve the framers’ 
more general purposes in light of changed circumstances). History is an important interpretative tool 
in both originalist and nonoriginalist approaches to constitutional interpretation. 
 13 See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 18–19 
(1972) (“‘Democracy,’ referring to a distinctive form of government, meant the direct, complete, and 
continuing control of the legislative and executive branches of government by the people as a whole 
. . . . [A]ll but extreme conservatives by 1787 conceded that a ‘democratic element’ was essential, or 
at least unavoidable, in the composition of state governments.”). James Madison defined a pure de-
mocracy as “a Society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the 
Government in person.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING 
THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 404, 408 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). 
 14 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175–76 (1874) (“All the States had governments when 
the Constitution was adopted. In all the people participated to some extent, through their representa-
tives elected in the manner specifically provided. These governments the Constitution did not 
change.”); see also Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 89, 104 (2014) (stating that forty-nine out of fifty state constitutions contain an affirmative right 
to vote). 
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but as the centerpiece of a bundle of participatory rights derived from state law 
that citizens used during the founding era to directly influence and participate 
in government.15 
In particular, the democratic nature of state governments can be traced to 
founding-era state constitutions that preserved the fundamental right of citizens 
to “alter or abolish” their governments, which was similar to the “right of revolu-
tion” exercised by the colonists against the British during the Revolutionary 
War.16 By the Reconstruction era, the right to vote had largely replaced the “alter 
or abolish” authority as the mechanism through which the people expressed their 
sovereign authority.17 Although scholars have acknowledged the connection be-
tween voting and popular sovereignty,18 none have properly conceptualized vot-
ing as the rightful heir of the “alter or abolish” authority. Because Article I links 
voter qualifications for state and federal elections, arguably it is this understand-
ing of the right to vote in federal elections that is implicit in its text.19 
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I critiques the Court’s voting 
rights jurisprudence where it has erroneously deferred to the states’ authority 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Some court decisions allowed states to limit who can be an elector and have since been over-
ruled, but these decisions rightly recognized that the right to vote derives from state law. See, e.g., 
Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (inferring from various provi-
sions of the Constitution that “the right of suffrage is established and guaranteed” for federal elections 
but noting that the substance of the right is “established by the laws and constitution of the State”); 
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (“[S]ave as restrained by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments and other provisions of the Federal Constitution, the State may condition suffrage as it 
deems appropriate.”); Minor, 88 U.S. at 170 (“The United States has no voters in the States of its own 
creation.”). 
 16 Compare THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (decreeing that “whenev-
er any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or 
to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing 
its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness”), with 
PA. CONST. art. V (1776) (“[T]he community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right 
to reform, alter, or abolish government in such manner as shall be by that community judged most 
conducive to the public weal.”), VA. CONST. § 3 (1776) (“[A] majority of the community hath an 
indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish [government], in such man-
ner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.”), and THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James 
Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (invoking the “transcendent and precious right of the people to 
‘abolish or alter their governments’” as a justification for the new constitution). 
 17 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside  
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 458 (1994); Christian G. Fritz, Recovering the Lost Worlds of 
America’s Written Constitutions, 68 ALA. L. REV. 261, 268 (2005). 
 18 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAM-
PAIGN FINANCE (2002) (proposing a campaign finance system that would allow voters to donate gov-
ernment provided funds anonymously to candidates, resulting in more voter control over elected offi-
cials and the direction of policy); Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Com-
pactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
301, 315 (1991) (arguing that voting is “a means to affirm the philosophy of popular sovereignty”); 
see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (linking an equally weighted vote directly to the prin-
ciple of popular sovereignty). 
 19 See infra notes 117–148 and accompanying text.  
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over elections, ignoring that states safeguard federal rights and therefore should 
be subject to higher scrutiny.20 As Part II demonstrates, this scrutiny is justified 
because Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution incorporates state substan-
tive law governing voter qualifications as well as democratic norms regarding 
access to the franchise that were nascent during the founding era, but quickly 
developed over the course of the nineteenth century.21 The historical analysis in 
Part III illustrates that the American people have had robust political participa-
tion since the founding, first through their natural right to “alter or abolish” their 
state governments and later through the right to vote.22 The extension of the 
franchise to non-freeholding males in the first half of the nineteenth century; the 
decline of state “alter or abolish” provisions during the Civil War; and the signif-
icance of political rights in the wake of emancipation made voting an obvious 
replacement for the once vigorous “alter or abolish” authority. The Civil War era 
cemented the evolution of this power from one focused on violent overthrow to 
one centered on the premise that the legitimacy of government is determined by 
periodic elections that are an accurate gauge of public sentiment. 
Given the democratic nature of most state governments for over two hun-
dred years, Part IV makes the normative claim that, because states safeguard 
federal voting rights, Article I requires that courts apply heightened scrutiny to 
state voting regulations.23 By focusing on voter identification laws and proof 
of citizenship requirements, this Part shows that heightened scrutiny is con-
sistent with the original understanding of Article I, which was that citizen par-
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 28–116 and accompanying text.  
 21 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 24 (2000) (stating that the “experience of the 
revolution—the political and military trauma of breaking with a sovereign power, fighting a war, and 
creating a new state—served to crack the ideological framework that had upheld and justified a lim-
ited voting”); see also infra notes 117–148 and accompanying text. I recognize that most women and 
minorities could not vote for extended periods of time throughout American history, and universal 
suffrage in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries referred to extending the right to vote to nonfree-
holding white males and, in some cases, noncitizens. Nonetheless, the term “democracy” and refer-
ences to “democratic norms” should be read in light of our evolving constitutional tradition of ex-
panded access to the ballot from the founding onward. See U.S. Const. amends. XIV; XV; IXX; 
XXIV; XXVI; see also Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 974–77 (2002) (arguing that the Fourteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments have to be read together despite section 2 of the Fourteenth’s language pro-
hibition of abridgments on the right of males to vote); RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECON-
STRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 2 (2004) (“When the states joined the 
Union after ratification of the Constitution in 1789, only three permitted blacks to vote: Maine, Ten-
nessee, and Vermont. . . . By 1865, free African American men voted only in Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Vermont, and Rhode Island.”). 
 22 See infra notes 149–260 and accompanying text. Arguably, there was a consensus until at least 
the mid-nineteenth century that the right to alter or abolish government was a natural right that be-
longed to the people. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 2 
(1819) (referring to the alter or abolish power as “an inalienable, and indefeasible right”); MISS. 
CONST. art. I, § 2 (1832) (same). 
 23 See infra notes 261–306 and accompanying text. 
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ticipation in the political process would continue to be dynamic and expansive 
post-ratification.24 Thus, the state-friendly balancing test derived from Anderson 
v. Celebrezze,25 Burdick v. Takushi,26 and Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board,27 used to assess restrictions on the right to vote in state and federal elec-
tions under the Equal Protection Clause, has to be reformulated in light of these 
considerations. Although states have considerable authority to regulate elections, 
the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I requires that courts sharpen their 
scrutiny of state interests in assessing regulations of the right to vote. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S INVERSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND 
STRUCTURE IN ASSESSING STATE ELECTION LAWS 
The Supreme Court has developed a federal right to vote that has little 
connection to the positive law of the states.28 Under the Court’s jurisprudence, 
the right to vote in federal elections not only has a different textual home than 
its state counterpart, it is also substantively different; consequently, the states’ 
obligations to their voters can change depending on the election at issue.29 In 
recent cases, however, the Equal Protection Clause has come to dominate the 
Court’s assessment of all state electoral regulations.30 Although commentators 
have criticized the dubious origins of the Court’s equal protection framework, 
many agreed with the Court’s decision to assess state voting regulations under 
strict scrutiny.31 Applying this standard, the Court struck down a series of re-
                                                                                                                           
 24 See infra notes 261–306 and accompanying text. 
 25 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 26 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
 27 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008). 
 28 See infra notes 29–116 and accompanying text.  
 29 See generally Douglas, supra note 14 (arguing that “[t]he textual and substantive differences 
between U.S. and state constitutional voting-rights protections requires a state-focused methodology 
for state constitutional clauses that grant the right to vote”). Arguably, this “state-focused” methodol-
ogy should also apply when construing the right to vote under the US. Constitution, precisely because 
Article I, Section 2 links the qualifications of federal electors to those same state constitutional provi-
sions. See infra notes 261–306 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 42–73 and accompanying text. 
 31 See, e.g., Alfred Avins, The Equal “Protection” of the Laws: The Original Understanding, 12 
N.Y.L.F. 385, 427 (1966) (“[T]he right to vote is not the type of ‘protection’ contemplated by this 
clause. The Supreme Court’s slogan, ‘one person, one vote’ which it alleges it has derived from the 
Equal Protection Clause is simply a figment of that Court’s imagination.” (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964))); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 981, 1065–66 (1979) (arguing that, from a textual standpoint, “Harper [v. Virginia 
State Board of Elections] seems a less defensible result than Roe [v. Wade]; the framers were silent 
about abortion, but rather vocal about the source of authority to regulate distribution of the franchise,” 
but justifying the decision on the grounds that the Constitution, “taken together with the series of 
enfranchising amendments, evinces a commitment to political participation values”). But see William 
W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the “Right” to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thir-
ty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 73–74 (arguing that some of the framers believed that 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress and the courts to regulate voting rights). 
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strictive regulations in the 1960s and 1970s including the poll tax, malappor-
tioned redistricting plans, and laws that impermissibly narrowed the field of 
eligible voters.32 
But concerns about relying on the Equal Protection Clause as the source 
of the right proved to be well-founded, as the Court’s failure to develop an af-
firmative theory of voting has allowed varied, sometimes troubling, assess-
ments of state election laws.33 As scholars have recognized, the Court oscil-
lates between individual and structuralist theories of the right to vote instead of 
developing a coherent theory.34 Structuralists argue that the right cannot be 
divorced from the democratic values that underlie our system of elections as a 
whole, and in determining harm, courts must consider values such as overall 
competitiveness and voter participation.35 Individual rights scholars, on the 
other hand, focus on harms independent of electoral outcomes, notably the 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560–61; 
infra notes 42–90 and accompanying text. 
 33 Vote dilution claims present a special problem for the equal protection framework because, 
technically, all eligible individuals can still vote, which means it is not outright vote denial in the 
traditional sense, but the state has drawn legislative districts in a manner that frustrates the ability of 
minority groups to elect their candidate of choice. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to 
an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1700 (2001) (assessing the Court’s racial gerrymander-
ing cases and arguing that “[b]y applying the same form of strict scrutiny used for conventional indi-
vidual rights, the Court necessarily endorsed a conception of dilution that fails to capture what makes 
that injury unique.”). 
 34 There is an extensive literature debating the structuralist versus individual rights framework for 
conceptualizing the right to vote. Compare Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is 
Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1996) (“[T]he very purpose of apportionment is to treat voters 
as members of groups. Thus, the usual alternative to group-based treatment, individualized deci-
sionmaking, is unavailable.”), and Pildes, supra note 9, at 40 (“Understandings of rights or equality 
worked out in other domains of constitutional law often badly fit the sphere of democratic politics 
. . . . The kinds of harms that constitutional law recognizes, the tools of doctrinal analysis, and the 
remedial options ought to be viewed distinctly in the domain of democratic institutions.”), with RICH-
ARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. 
CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 139, 154 (2003) (rejecting a structuralist approach to voting rights cases), 
Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1292 (2011) 
(arguing that the individual rights framework is appropriate for assessing the new vote denial cases, 
which deal with issues of who can vote rather than questions of how to aggregate votes to ensure 
fairness and equality among groups), and Chad Flanders, How to Think About Voter Fraud (And 
Why), 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 93, 150 n.138 (2008) (siding with the “individualist” rather than the 
“structuralist” analysis of voter fraud controversies). But see Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of 
Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2005) (arguing that the rights-structure debate “does not 
significantly advance the goal of understanding and evaluating the role of the Court in democratic 
politics” because in these cases, “[w]hether styled as [involving] individual rights claims or structural 
claims, courts can, and most likely will and sometimes must, use an individual rights framework to 
confront the structural pathologies of the electoral process”). 
 35 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648 (1998). 
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value intrinsic in the right to vote that, when denied, causes an expressive or 
dignitary harm to the voter.36 
In reality, the right to vote can be explained by one of these theories, all of 
these theories, and possibly, none of these theories, at any given time.37 There 
will be instances of vote denial that implicate the expressive, or as Joseph 
Fishkin frames it, the “dignitary” dimensions of voting that signal one’s place 
in the community as a full citizen.38 Similarly, the right to vote also factors into 
democratic design and electoral outcomes such that judicial decisions concern-
ing politics and governance must account for the right in critiquing the rules 
and regulations that structure democracy.39 
Despite these approaches, one cannot develop an affirmative theory of 
voting without a full appreciation of the framework created by the constitu-
tional text with respect to voter qualifications and, by implication, political 
participation.40 Yet courts and commentators have ignored the text and struc-
ture, and as a result, much of the case law has developed exactly backwards. 
As this Part shows, the strict scrutiny analysis once used by courts to assess 
voting regulations has devolved into a highly deferential balancing test derived 
from cases dealing with presidential elections, which are inapposite to the state 
and federal elections governed by Article I. Moreover, the Court has divorced 
state and federal voting rights in its reapportionment cases, further distancing 
its assessment of state electoral laws from the rigorous scrutiny that Article I 
demands. Finally, its jurisprudence under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 further 
illustrates the harms of the Court’s approach to state election laws because 
these cases tend to vindicate state sovereignty at the expense of protecting vot-
er participation in the electoral process.41 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Fishkin, supra note 34, at 1333–34 (arguing that the structuralist approach ignores the 
“equal citizenship dimension of the right to vote” where the individual voter participates, not solely 
because of the prospect of altering electoral outcomes, but because it signifies one’s status as a full 
citizen). 
 37 See James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community, and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influ-
ence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 900 (1997) (arguing that 
“[v]oting has no intrinsic value”). But see Fishkin, supra note 34, at 1296 (discussing the dignitary 
and expressive value of voting). 
 38 Fishkin, supra note 34, at 1296, 1334. 
 39 See Richard H. Pildes, What Kind of Right Is “The Right To Vote”?, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 45, 
46 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/pildes.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/78XV-YVY2. 
 40 This Article does not seek to engage in the individual/structuralist debate, and instead focuses 
on the logical starting point for determining the substance of voting rights—the constitutional text and 
history—which would precede any analysis about the scope of judicial review. 
 41 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and 
Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–246, §§ 4–5, 120 Stat. 577, 580–81 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Voting Rights Act is also referred to herein as “VRA” or “the 
Act.” 
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A. Turning Left Instead of Right: Voter Participation and Judicial 
Confusion between Article I and Article II Elections 
Arguably, the Court’s current methodology has been harmful to voting 
rights, but oddly, its deferential approach derives from cases that were extremely 
protective of the right to vote. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court 
applied strict scrutiny and invalidated the poll tax on the grounds that the tax 
invidiously discriminated on the basis of wealth.42 Harper marked a notable de-
parture from a case, decided just seven years earlier, applying rational basis re-
view to a state law that imposed a literacy test as a prerequisite to voting.43 Simi-
larly, Reynolds v. Sims held that the states’ failure to reapportion their state legis-
lative districts violated the Equal Protection Clause because malapportionment, 
like the poll tax at issue in Harper, unduly infringed upon “the fundamental 
principle of representative government in this country [which] is one of equal 
representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, econom-
ic status, or place of residence within a State.”44 The Court then adopted a prin-
ciple designed to prevent the vote dilution that had persisted through the states’ 
failure to redistrict: one person, one vote.45 
Notably, neither Harper nor Reynolds stand for the proposition that the 
right to vote in state elections has to exist, even if the corresponding right to 
vote in federal elections must exist. Harper made this explicit by grounding 
the right to vote in federal elections in the Voter Qualifications Clause of Arti-
cle I while searching elsewhere for a right to vote in state elections (including 
the First Amendment) before settling on the Equal Protection Clause.46 Cases 
decided subsequent to Harper initially accorded very strong protection to the 
right to vote, but this trend quickly reversed itself. In Kramer v. Union Free 
School District, for example, the Supreme Court held that a childless stock-
broker who lived with his parents could not be excluded from school board 
elections because the governing statute unduly narrowed the scope of the rele-
                                                                                                                           
 42 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
 43 Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1959). 
 44 377 U.S. 533, 560–61 (1964). 
 45 Id. at 569. The Court stated: 
We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires 
that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a 
population basis. Simply stated, an individual’s right to vote for state legislators is un-
constitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when com-
pared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State. 
Id. 
 46 383 U.S. at 666–67. 
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vant electorate.47 Similarly, in Bullock v. Carter, the Court invalidated the fil-
ing fees Texas imposed on candidates for certain state and federal offices, find-
ing that the fees had an appreciable effect on voting even though there were 
other avenues available for candidates to get on the ballot that did not require 
the payment of a fee.48 Notably, the Court did not find that ballot access laws 
imposed the same burden on the right to vote as they did on the candidate’s 
ability to get on the ballot.49 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that “the rights 
of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separa-
tion,” and opted to assess the impact of Texas’s ballot access law under the 
rigorous analysis commanded by Harper.50 
Kramer and Bullock are extensions of Harper’s strong conception of the 
right to vote as a fundamental interest, yet the caselaw quickly devolved from 
treating voting as a means of facilitating political power to allowing states to 
circumscribe political participation without adequate justification.51 Arguably, 
the decrease in judicial scrutiny of state electoral regulations occurred because 
the Court appropriated the balancing test for assessing regulations that govern 
presidential elections into the context of all elections. While the Court has in-
terpreted Article I to require that the right to vote in federal elections be man-
datory, Article II gives state legislatures significantly more flexibility in deter-
mining whether to extend the right to vote in presidential elections to its citi-
zens.52 But once the state allows its citizens to vote for President, the Court 
closely scrutinizes the terms upon which the right is extended because of the 
weighty national interest involved.53 The Court has taken a similar approach in 
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, implicitly allowing states to rescind 
                                                                                                                           
 47 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (“Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate 
in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative 
government.”). 
 48 405 U.S. 134, 146 (1972) (rejecting the State’s argument that “a candidate can gain a place on 
the ballot in the general election without payment of fees by submitting a proper application accom-
panied by a voter petition” on the grounds that it forces the candidate to bypass the primary election 
which “may be more crucial than the general election in certain parts of Texas”). 
 49 Id. at 142 (applying the Harper standard for review of ballot access laws). 
 50 Id. at 143; see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (invalidating Tennessee’s one 
year durational residency requirement for state voters as an infringement on the fundamental right to 
vote). 
 51 See infra notes 61–73 and accompanying text. 
 52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as 
the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.”); see McPherson v. Blacker, 146 
U.S. 1, 27 (1892) (“The Constitution does not provide that the appointment of electors shall be by 
popular vote, nor that the electors shall be voted for upon a general ticket, nor that the majority of 
those who exercise the elective franchise can alone choose the electors. It recognizes that the people 
act through their representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define 
the method of effecting the object.”). 
 53 Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“We deal here not 
with an ordinary election, but with an election for the President of the United States.”). 
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the right to vote in state elections, and scrutinizing only the terms upon which 
the right has been extended.54 However, borrowing from Article II to deter-
mine the appropriate level of scrutiny for elections governed by Article I has 
led to the development of a strict-scrutiny-like balancing test that gives signifi-
cant weight to the national interest implicated in presidential elections, but is 
overly deferential to the states when this interest is absent. 
For example, in Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Court applied the balancing 
test to a restrictive law that limited the ability of presidential candidates to get 
on the Ohio ballot.55 The law at issue required independent candidates to de-
clare their candidacy earlier than the nominees of the two major political par-
ties.56 The majority recognized that its earlier cases had upheld ballot access 
restrictions in order to promote the state’s interest in avoiding political frag-
mentation, but this precedent was “in the context of elections wholly within the 
boundaries” of the state.57 In contrast, the “State’s interest in regulating a na-
tionwide Presidential election is not nearly as strong,” leading the Court to in-
validate the restrictive ballot access regulation in this context.58 Anderson ap-
plied a version of the balancing test that was virtually identical to Harper’s 
strict scrutiny standard.59 In both cases, the Court closely scrutinized and re-
jected the state’s reasons for its regulation.60 However, cases purporting to fol-
low Anderson weakened this standard once it was appropriated outside of the 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (“[I]t is enough to say that once 
the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 55 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 56 Id. at 783.  
 57 Id. at 804. 
 58 Id.; see Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 732 (1974) (finding that there is an “important state 
interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support” before allowing 
a candidate to be on the ballot, but remanding for consideration of whether the five percent signature 
requirement placed an unconstitutional burden on ballot access for congressional and presidential 
candidates (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971))). 
 59 Prior to Anderson, the strict scrutiny analysis required that the Court assess “the character of 
the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the govern-
mental interests asserted in support of the classification.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 
(1972). The Court also required the state to come forward with “a substantial and compelling reason” 
for the regulation. Id. This is very similar to Anderson’s requirement that the Court “consider the 
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments,” “identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for 
the burden imposed by its rule,” “determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests,” 
and “consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” 
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 
 60 See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796–806; Harper, 383 U.S. at 668; see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 
U.S. 23, 31–32 (1968) (invalidating a restrictive ballot access law that kept a third party off the presi-
dential ballot on the grounds that the law was designed to insulate the two political parties from com-
petition and therefore was not a “compelling interest” that justified the regulation). 
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presidential election context because the strong national interest that justified 
heightened scrutiny was missing.61 
In Burdick v. Takushi, for example, the petitioner challenged a state law 
that prevented him from writing in Donald Duck as his candidate of choice for 
a Hawaiian congressional election.62 The Court rejected his argument on the 
grounds that state law provided a myriad of opportunities for the petitioner to 
get his preferred candidate on the ballot.63 Given the other avenues for partici-
pation, the Court characterized the burden on the right to vote as “limited,” and 
relaxed its scrutiny of the state’s reasons for imposing the write-in ban.64 Bur-
dick treated the state’s interest as paramount to that of the petitioner because, 
unlike Anderson, there was no countervailing national interest that warranted 
heightened scrutiny of the state regulation.65 As a result, the Court applied a 
watered-down version of the balancing test, accepting at face value the state’s 
interest in “avoiding the possibility of unrestrained factionalism at the general 
election” without requiring proof that the write-in ban furthered this interest.66 
In the years since Burdick, the Court has not acknowledged that the case 
significantly undermined Anderson, an outcome that was propelled by the ab-
                                                                                                                           
 61 Arguably, elections for members of the House of Representatives can have national implica-
tions, but unlike the elections for President and Vice President, House elections are not “national” in 
the sense that those elected represent the entire population of the United States. See Anderson, 460 
U.S. at 794–95 (“In the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a 
uniquely important national interest. For the President and the Vice President of the United States are 
the only elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation.”). 
 62 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992). 
 63 Id. at 436–37. The Court explained:  
Although Hawaii makes no provision for write-in voting in its primary or general elec-
tions, the system outlined above provides for easy access to the ballot until the cutoff 
date for the filing of nominating petitions, two months before the primary. Consequent-
ly, any burden on voters’ freedom of choice and association is borne only by those who 
fail to identify their candidate of choice until days before the primary. 
Id. 
 64 Id. at 438–39. 
 65 Id. at 434. The Court explained: 
Under [the Anderson] standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a 
state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights 
are subjected to “severe” restrictions, the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to ad-
vance a state interest of compelling importance.” But when a state election law provi-
sion imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon the First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights of voters, “the State’s important regulatory interests are gen-
erally sufficient to justify” the restrictions. 
Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)); see also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788. 
 66 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 
(1986)). But see id. at 448–49 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state has failed to justify the 
ban “under any level of scrutiny” because the ban does not serve the state’s interest in preventing sore 
loser candidacies). 
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sence of a national interest that would have otherwise justified increased scrutiny 
of the state’s interests under the balancing approach. Recently, in Crawford v. 
Marion County Election Board, the Court applied the Anderson balancing test to 
assess the burdens of Indiana’s voter identification law on the right to vote.67 
Prior to Crawford, most litigation strategies challenging voter identification laws 
on constitutional grounds equated these laws to an unconstitutional poll tax.68 
This analogy forced the Court to confront the inconsistencies in its caselaw re-
garding the appropriate standard of review given that Harper had resolved the 
constitutionality of the poll tax using strict scrutiny; even Anderson applied a 
balancing test that was strict-scrutiny-like and proper application could have led 
to the invalidation of Indiana’s voter identification law.69 However, the manner 
in which the Court had resolved the issues in Burdick raised questions about the 
appropriate standard of review because of the Court’s extreme deference to the 
state’s regulatory interests in that case while purporting to apply Anderson.70 In 
Crawford, the Court struggled to reconcile all of these conflicting cases, ulti-
mately reserving strict scrutiny for “rational restrictions on the right to vote . . . 
unrelated to voter qualifications,” and holding that, for the remaining regula-
tions, courts must “identify and evaluate the interests put forward by the State as 
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.”71 Crawford thus endorsed a 
version of the balancing test that mimicked the Court’s approach in Burdick, de-
manding little evidence from Indiana to corroborate its asserted interest in pre-
venting fraud through its voter identification law.72 The Court ignored that Bur-
dick’s watered down balancing test is ill-suited to protect the political participa-
tion safeguarded by the Voter Qualifications Clause. Despite the absence of a 
national interest, this Article will show that the appropriate standard of review is 
much closer to the strong version of the balancing test embraced by the Ander-
son Court.73 
                                                                                                                           
 67 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008). 
 68 See id. at 203 (noting that the petitioners’ brief stressed that all the Republicans in the General 
Assembly had voted for the voter identification law while all the Democrats opposed it); see also 
Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1354–55 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s 
claim that the Georgia photo identification requirement functioned as a poll tax). 
 69 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189–91. 
 70 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438–39 (1992).  
 71 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189–90 (“[E]ven rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidi-
ous if they are unrelated to voter qualifications.”). But see id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing 
that the Burdick standard applies “[t]o evaluate a law respecting the right to vote—whether it governs 
voter qualifications, candidate selection, or the voting process” and it “calls for application of a defer-
ential ‘important regulatory interests’ standard for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory restrictions, reserving 
strict scrutiny for laws that severely restrict the right to vote”). 
 72 Id. at 194 (majority opinion) (“The only kind of voter fraud that SEA 483 addresses is in-
person voter impersonation at polling places. The record contains no evidence of any such fraud actu-
ally occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.”). 
 73 See infra notes 261–306 and accompanying text. 
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B. Reapportionment and the Well-Intentioned, but Misguided, 
Judicial Safe Harbor 
Drawing on Harper’s distinction between state and federal elections, the 
Supreme Court’s reapportionment jurisprudence has distinguished state legisla-
tive redistricting from congressional redistricting in a manner contrary to the 
structure of Article I.74 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court grounded the equipopu-
lation rule of one person, one vote in the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment for state legislative redistricting,75 but in Wesberry v. Sand-
ers, the companion case to Reynolds, the Court read the language in Article I, 
Section 2 that Representatives be chosen “by the People of the several States,” 
as the source of the equipopulation principle for congressional redistricting.76 
In making this distinction, the Court ignored that Article I, Section 2 makes 
federal voting rights dependent upon state law, suggesting that there has to be 
some continuity between the standards used to assess redistricting plans at both 
levels of government.77 This remains true even if the Equal Protection Clause 
sets minimum standards that all states must comply with in the course of draw-
ing districts. 
Thus, just as the Harper standard evolved from strict scrutiny into an 
overly-deferential balancing test, cases decided subsequent to Reynolds devel-
oped a safe harbor in the reapportionment context that insulated state legisla-
tive—but not congressional—redistricting plans from constitutional attack if 
the plan’s deviation from the one person, one vote principle was less than ten 
percent from the ideal district.78 In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, the Supreme Court 
held that states have to minimize population variances and achieve precise 
mathematical equality “as nearly as practicable” for congressional districts.79 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
 75 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 76 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8. 
 77 See infra notes 117–148 and accompanying text. 
 78 The Court had, on prior occasions, suggested that states must have a compelling reason for 
deviating from the equipopulation principle, but the Court has not been consistent in this approach. 
Compare Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969) (holding that to comport with Art. I, § 2, 
deviations have to be “unavoidable”), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (stating that 
the Equal Protection Clause requires states to make “an honest and good faith effort” to construct 
districts with equal population), with Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 160–62 (1993) (allowing 
deviations of more than ten percent from the ideal district because “[t]he Equal Protection Clause does 
require that electoral districts be ‘of nearly equal population, so that each person’s vote may be given 
equal weight in the election of representatives.’ . . . But the requirement is not an inflexible one” (in-
ternal citation omitted)), and infra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing two decisions where the 
Supreme Court allowed deviations from the ideal district because of the state’s interest in maintaining 
the integrity of political subdivision lines). 
 79 Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530–31 (“The extent to which equality may practicably be achieved 
may differ from State to State and from district to district. Since ‘equal representation for equal num-
bers of people [is] the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives,’ the ‘as nearly as practica-
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Although later cases interpreted the “as nearly as practicable” language from 
Kirkpatrick to impose a zero deviation standard for congressional redistrict-
ing,80 the Court did not hold state legislative districts to the same standard be-
cause “the command of Art. I, § 2, as regards the national legislature out-
weighs the local interests that a State may deem relevant in apportioning dis-
tricts for representatives to state and local legislatures.”81 Like the Court’s 
scrutiny of regulations governing presidential elections, the presence of a na-
tional interest justified heightened scrutiny of the state’s congressional redis-
tricting plan.82  
In contrast, the Court has lessened its scrutiny for elections “wholly with-
in the boundaries” of a state.83 The Court has applied rational basis review to 
state legislative redistricting plans with deviations that resulted from policy 
considerations such as “making districts compact, respecting municipal bound-
aries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between 
incumbent Representatives.”84 For example, in Mahan v. Howell, the Supreme 
Court allowed a deviation of 16.4% from the ideal district in a Virginia state 
legislative redistricting plan on the grounds that the state’s policy of maintain-
ing the integrity of political subdivision lines justified the deviation.85 In up-
holding the plan, the Court ignored that adhering to political subdivision lines 
can dilute the voting rights of residents within those districts without adequate 
justification.86 In fact, the Court’s retreat from strict enforcement of the equi-
                                                                                                                           
ble’ standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equali-
ty.” (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964))). 
 80 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1983) (finding that a plan with a .1384% deviation 
violated the one person, one vote principle). 
 81 Id. at 732–33. 
 82 See id. 
 83 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 804 (1983); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 793 
(1973) (“Keeping in mind that congressional districts are not so intertwined and freighted with strictly 
local interests as are state legislative districts and that, as compared with the latter, they are relatively 
enormous, with each percentage point of variation representing almost 5,000 people, we are not in-
clined to disturb Kirkpatrick and Wells.”). 
 84 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 622–23 (1964) (Harlan, J. 
dissenting) (holding that states may consider history, economic and group interests, area, geography, 
“effective representation for sparsely settled areas,” “availability of access of citizens to their repre-
sentatives,” theories of bicameralism, occupation, balancing urban and rural power, and voter prefer-
ence).  
 85 410 U.S. 315, 324–25 (1973); see also Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 847–48 (1983) 
(upholding a state legislative redistricting plan that had a deviation of 89 percent from the ideal district 
because of state’s interest in preserving county boundaries and political subdivisions). 
 86 Cf. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1327, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 
(invalidating a state legislative redistricting plan in Georgia, despite having a deviation from the ideal 
of less than ten percent, because the plan represented “an intentional effort to allow incumbent Demo-
crats to maintain or increase their delegation, primarily by systematically underpopulating the districts 
held by incumbent Democrats, overpopulating those of Republicans, and by deliberately pairing nu-
merous Republican incumbents against one another”). 
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population principle stemmed from pragmatic concerns that did little to justify 
the deviation. The Court concluded that state legislative redistricting can in-
volve significantly more seats than congressional plans, and thus “[a]pplication 
of the ‘absolute equality’ test . . . to state legislative redistricting may impair 
the normal function of state and local governments.”87 Yet the state did not 
advance any arguments in Mahan that strict application of the one person, one 
vote doctrine, or instituting a plan with smaller deviations, would “impair the 
normal function” of its government.88 The Court simply deferred to the state 
without requiring evidence that would illustrate that the deviations were neces-
sary.89 Because of the safe harbor, states can depart from the one person, one 
vote standard with impunity, despite the existence of constitutional text that 
strongly implies that more scrutiny is warranted. 
Given this, the juxtaposition between the Court’s voter participation, bal-
lot access, and reapportionment cases is striking. The Court ultimately con-
cluded, in all of these contexts, that the presence of local interests justified ex-
treme deference to the state’s regulatory prerogatives, an odd result when Arti-
cle I arguably commands parity between the standards applied to state and fed-
eral elections. In recent years, the Court has responded to this need for equiva-
lence by further decreasing its standard of review in the reapportionment con-
text and expanding the safe harbor. In Tennant v. Jefferson County Commis-
sion, the Supreme Court imposed a safe harbor for congressional redistricting 
by expanding Kirkpatrick’s “as nearly as practicable” language to allow states 
to deviate from the equipopulation principle for policy reasons.90 As this Part 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Mahan, 410 U.S. at 323. 
 88 See id. at 338 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan criticized the majority for allowing 
deviations in the context of state legislative redistricting, arguing that states must come forward with a 
compelling justification to justify deviations in both contexts. See id. 
 89 See id. at 323 (Majority opinion). Because federal voting rights are dependent upon state law, it 
is all but certain that population variances in state legislative redistricting will have some impact on 
federal voting rights. In addition, state and federal elected officials also use redistricting as a mecha-
nism to further the common goals of their respective political party, often at the expense of voters. See 
generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 282 (2000) (“Candidates may need the parties somewhat less than they used to; 
state parties may be somewhat less powerful than they were formerly; but there is no doubt that politi-
cal parties continue to play a crucial role in forging links between officials at the state and federal 
level. The political dependency of state and federal officials on each other remains among the most 
notable facts of American government.”); see also Daryl Levinson & Richard Pildes, Separation of 
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2380–81 (2006). In the context of congressional dis-
tricts, there are federalism considerations that justify partisan gerrymandering in certain circumstanc-
es. See Franita Tolson, Benign Partisanship, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 395, 398 (2012); Franita Tol-
son, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859, 862–63. This 
justification is missing with respect to state legislative redistricting, making the safe harbor even more 
difficult to justify. 
 90 Tennant v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2012) (holding that a congressional redis-
tricting plan with a 0.79 deviation from the ideal did not violate the one person, one vote principle 
because the deviations were necessary to achieve legitimate state objectives). 
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shows, this development in the doctrine, from strict scrutiny to a rational-basis-
like balancing standard that governs judicial review across the board, arguably 
can be traced back to Harper’s delineation of state and federal voting rights in 
contravention of the structure established by Article I. 
C. The State Sovereignty Narrative and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
Like the Supreme Court’s voter participation and reapportionment cases, 
the Court’s Voting Rights Act jurisprudence reflects similar concerns about 
whether federal law frustrates the states’ ability to carry out their constitutional 
tasks regarding election regulation.91 Yet the Court has ignored that Article I 
speaks to this very issue, instead relying on a “free-floating” federalism norm 
to vindicate the state interests in this area.92 While states enjoy broad authority 
to regulate state and federal elections, Article I (like the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments) limits their ability to restrict voting rights in both con-
texts. 
Until recently, sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act suspended all 
voting related changes in certain jurisdictions, mostly in the south, until those 
changes were approved by the federal government.93 In South Carolina v. Kat-
zenbach, the Supreme Court upheld section 5 of the Act on the grounds that the 
law was an appropriate means of carrying out the objectives of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which “supersedes contrary exertions of state power.”94 Katzen-
                                                                                                                           
 91 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (1965). 
 92 Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights 
Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (2012) [hereinafter Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty]. As I have 
argued: 
Because of this presumption that the states are sovereign over elections, the Supreme 
Court has employed a “federalism norm” that has undermined the effectiveness of the 
[Voting Rights] Act. . . . The federalism norm is a nontextual, free-floating conception 
of the federal/state balance of power that the Court uses to “restore” the original bal-
ance of power between the states and the federal government. Besides the fact that the 
norm is pro state sovereignty and disregards the significant federal authority in this ar-
ea, the Court ignores that the original balance is an elusive and arbitrary concept. 
Id. (citations omitted). While the Court relies on the Tenth Amendment as the source of the state’s 
authority over state elections, it has interpreted the Elections Clause to empower states to regulate 
federal elections so long as Congress chooses not to displace state regulations. See Arizona v. Inter 
Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253–54 (2014). Yet the persistence of this federalism 
norm has led the Court to discount the breadth of congressional authority over both state and federal 
elections. See Franita Tolson, Congressional Authority to Protect Voting Rights After Shelby County 
and Arizona Inter Tribal, 13 ELECTION L.J. 322, 327 (2014) [hereinafter Tolson, Congressional Au-
thority] (noting that recent decisions acknowledge “that various constitutional provisions bear on 
congressional authority over elections but . . . fail[ ] to incorporate them into any meaningful analysis 
regarding the scope of this power”). 
 93 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006). 
 94 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966). 
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bach recognized that unprecedented actions were necessary to ensure that the 
right to vote was extended equally to all individuals; the VRA was a necessary 
outgrowth of the southern states’ recalcitrant and unapologetic denial of basic 
rights to African-Americans.95 In upholding the Act, the Court interpreted 
Congress’s enforcement authority under the Fifteenth Amendment to embody 
“the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause,” an 
expansive reading of congressional power sufficient to justify legislation that 
would otherwise raise federalism concerns.96 
In the years since Katzenbach, the Court has increased its scrutiny of leg-
islation enacted pursuant to Congress’s enforcement authority under the Four-
teenth Amendment, a move that has had far reaching consequences for the 
VRA.97 In recent cases, the Court has been more receptive to the state sover-
eignty objections lodged against the Act, circumscribing its reach in a series of 
decisions.98 In particular, in the 2009 decision Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District Number One v. Holder, the Supreme Court explicitly recog-
nized the tension between state sovereignty and the requirements of the Voting 
Rights Act.99 Rather than invalidating sections 4(b) and 5 on federalism 
grounds, however, the Court read the Act broadly to allow a small utility dis-
trict to “bail out” from under the statute.100 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See id. at 310–15. 
 96 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 
421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”)). 
 97 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom 
Act of 1993 exceeds Congress’ power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Ruth Colker, 
The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783, 784 (2002). 
Although Congress originally enacted the Voting Rights Act pursuant to its authority under the Fif-
teenth Amendment, it reauthorized various provisions of the Act under both the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments over the last four decades. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 
2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594, 594 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12–96) (granting petition for a writ 
of certiorari and acknowledging that the preclearance regime is based on dual sources of constitutional 
authority). 
 98 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 26 (2009) (holding that the state was not obligated 
to protect a minority influence district where doing so would violate state law because minorities were 
less than fifty percent of the voting population in the district and therefore had no cognizable claim 
under the VRA); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) (holding that the Depart-
ment of Justice could not deny preclearance to a plan that was discriminatory but non-retrogressive 
because this would “exacerbate the ‘substantial’ federalism costs that the preclearance procedure al-
ready exacts”). 
 99 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009). 
 100 Id. at 206–07 (noting that “Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act authorizes a bailout suit by a 
‘State or political subdivision’” and that the Act defines political subdivision to include “‘any other 
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting,’” but rejecting the argument that the 
plaintiff did not qualify, even though it did not conduct its own voter registration, because “specific 
precedent, the structure of the Voting Rights Act, and underlying constitutional concerns compel a 
broader reading of the bailout provision” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006))). 
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In 2013, the Court finally addressed the federalism issues head-on in 
Shelby County v. Holder, invalidating the coverage formula of section 4(b), 
which determined the jurisdictions subject to preclearance under section 5 of 
the Act.101 According to the Court, the formula impermissibly intruded on state 
sovereignty because Congress relied on 40-year-old data and long-eradicated 
practices such as literacy tests and poll taxes in selecting the states that had to 
ask “permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to 
enact and execute on their own.”102 Because the formula resulted in mostly 
southern jurisdictions being subject to the preclearance requirement, but not 
northern states that have equally problematic voting rights records, the Court 
held that section 4(b) violated the constitutional principle that the states enjoy 
equal sovereignty.103 In the Court’s view, Congress did not build a sufficient 
record, based on current conditions, to justify legislation that distinguished 
between the sovereign states.104 
Commentators have been critical of the Shelby County decision for a 
number of reasons.105 As I have argued in prior work, “[t]he Shelby County 
Court’s focus . . . [on whether Congress developed a formula based on] current 
conditions, rather than the reality that voting discrimination still exists in the 
covered jurisdictions, is a vast departure from prior precedent that focused in-
stead on reading the Act broad enough to effectuate the protections of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”106 In light of Article I, however, the 
majority’s departure from precedent could be justified, even if the case itself is 
problematic for other reasons.107 Arguably, Shelby County shifts the responsi-
bility of enforcing voting rights back to the states, which is consistent with the 
structure of Article I.108 Although the Reconstruction Amendments enhanced 
                                                                                                                           
 101 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622. (2013). 
 102 Id. at 2624. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 2629. 
 105 Scholars have questioned the origins of the equal sovereignty principle, arguing that this doc-
trine traces back to Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), which held that African-Americans could 
not be U.S. citizens, and does not stand as a foundational principle from the founding era. See James 
Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal Sovereignty and Restoring the Constitution-
al Right to Vote After Shelby County v. Holder, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 39, 39 (2014); see also 
Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 179–81 (2013), http://www.
yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-dignity-of-the-south, archived at http://perma.cc/YS7J-JR4J. 
 106 See Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 379, 436 (2014) (citing United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm’ns, 435 U.S. 110, 117–18 
(1978)). 
 107 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last Rites, and Voting 
Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 484 (2014) (noting that one plausible interpretation of Shelby County is 
that it is less an indictment of the Voting Rights Act itself and more about “communicating a message 
to Congress about the perils of political avoidance” in its failure to amend the VRA). 
 108 The Court makes this shift by relying on the Tenth Amendment, instead of Article I. See Shel-
by Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623. The Tenth Amendment, however, would explain only the state’s authori-
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the authority of the federal government to regulate access to the ballot, these 
Amendments did not completely eliminate state sovereignty in this area.109 
From this perspective, Shelby County may be better framed as a case in 
which the Court had to make a value judgment about whether the federal gov-
ernment built a record of discrimination sufficient to exercise their power un-
der the Reconstruction Amendments, thereby departing from Article I’s delega-
tion of authority to the states to “determine the conditions under which the 
right of suffrage may be exercised.”110 On this view, Katzenbach was correctly 
decided because voting related discrimination was pervasive at the time, but in 
the eyes of the Court, the 2006 reauthorization did not build a record of dis-
crimination that was extensive enough to justify a departure from the structure 
of Article I.111 The absence of discrimination similar to that present in Katzen-
bach provides some support for the Court’s conclusion that section 4(b) is 
overbroad because that provision suspends all changes to a state’s electoral 
laws, contrary to the state-centered framework of Article I.112 
Nevertheless, the Court ignores that Article I also demands consideration 
of the norms of participation inherent in the Voter Qualifications Clause, and 
by implication, the manner in which the Reconstruction Amendments changed 
the states’ authority over elections.113 The Court’s exclusive focus on state sov-
ereignty and its parsimonious treatment of the Reconstruction Amendments’ 
goal of preventing voting-based discrimination precluded any meaningful 
analysis of whether issues of racial exclusion were still pervasive enough to 
justify the preclearance regime.114 Arguably, Article I would require such an 
analysis in order to justify the shift from state to federal oversight of voting 
                                                                                                                           
ty over its own elections and not its power to regulate federal elections. See supra note 92 and accom-
panying text. 
 109 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; id. amend. XIV; id. amend. XV; see also Tolson, Reinventing 
Sovereignty, supra note 92, at 1200. 
 110 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965)). 
 111 See id. at 2629. 
 112 It is unclear whether Congress, in reauthorizing the preclearance regime, was required to cre-
ate a legislative record that mimics its 1965 counterpart or else risk exceeding the scope of their en-
forcement authority under the Reconstruction Amendments. Compare id. (“Regardless of how to look 
at the record, however, no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘fla-
grant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly dis-
tinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time.”), with id. at 2651 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (“Congress could determine from the record whether the jurisdictions captured by 
the coverage formula still belonged under the preclearance regime. If they did, there was no need to 
alter the formula.”). 
 113 See infra notes 149–260 and accompanying text. 
 114 Tolson, supra note 106, at 437 (noting that the equal sovereignty principle “strains credulity” 
because “[t]o say that Congress cannot pass legislation singling out the worst offenders, a circum-
stance that should justify a departure from this equality principle, would mean that Congress is consti-
tutionally obligated to pass legislation that is overbroad so as to maintain this principle of state equali-
ty”). 
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rights permitted by the Reconstruction Amendments.115 Like the reapportion-
ment cases before it, Shelby County errs in prioritizing “the fundamental prin-
ciple of equal sovereignty” over compelling evidence that the Constitution pro-
tects a conception of the right to vote that includes broad rights of participa-
tion. These rights expanded quickly in most states from the founding onward; 
were enshrined in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution; and were later rein-
forced by the Reconstruction Amendments.116 Shelby County rightly recogniz-
es that the Constitution makes the states, and not the federal government, the 
gatekeepers of the electoral process, but overlooks that Article I and the Re-
construction Amendments work in tandem. These provisions embrace a norm 
of broad participation that requires states to justify regulations that overly bur-
den the right to vote, and also could legitimize federal oversight of state elec-
toral processes. 
II. JUSTIFYING INCREASED SCRUTINY OF STATE ELECTION LAWS: THE 
HISTORY OF THE VOTER QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSE OF ARTICLE I 
The Constitutional Convention and ratification debates further illustrate 
that there are limitations on the states’ authority over voter qualifications under 
Article I that the Supreme Court has not accounted for in structuring its review 
of state electoral regulations—namely, the state constitutions. During these 
debates, proponents of the new Constitution relied on the Voter Qualifications 
Clause and the Guarantee Clause of Article IV to refute arguments that the 
Constitution would disenfranchise voters, pointing out that Article I’s reliance 
on state law prevented the federal government from disenfranchising any-
one.117 Implicit in this defense of Article I was an assumption that the states 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326, 327 (1966) (rejecting the argument that 
“Congress may appropriately do no more than to forbid violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in 
general terms” and recognizing that Congress “has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitution-
al prohibition against racial discrimination in voting”); see also Tolson, supra note 106, at 384–86 
(arguing that sections 2 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment together allow Congress to intervene in 
state electoral processes outside of reducing a state’s delegation in the House of Representatives). 
 116 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (internal citation omitted); Derek Muller, The Play in the 
Joints of the Elections Clauses, 13 ELECTION L.J. 310, 321 (2014) (suggesting that the outcomes in 
the Shelby County and Arizona Inter Tribal decisions resulted from the Court’s “renewed interest in 
protecting states from federal encroachment”). 
 117 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government.”). For further exploration of the Guarantee Clause foundations of 
the right to vote, see Franita Tolson, The Living Constitution(al) Right(s) to Vote (June 25, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For Antifederalist arguments that the proposed Consti-
tution would disenfranchise voters, see Letter from John Williams to His Constituents, ALBANY FED-
ERAL HERALD, Feb. 25, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 119 
(criticizing the new Constitution on the grounds that “[t]he elections may be so altered as to destroy 
the liberty of the people”); “Agrippa” (James Winthrop), Amend the Articles of Confederation or 
Amend the Constitution? Fourteen Conditions for Accepting the Constitution, MASSACHUSETTS GA-
ZETTE, Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 159 (“Nothing 
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would pose less of a threat to voting rights than the federal government. As 
James Madison argued in The Federalist No. 52: 
The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a 
fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent on 
the Convention therefore to define and establish this right, in the 
Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of 
Congress, would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. 
To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States, would 
have been improper for the same reason . . . . To have reduced the 
different qualifications in the different States, to one uniform rule, 
would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States, 
as it would have been difficult to the Convention. The provision 
made by the Convention [Article I, Section 2] appears, therefore, to 
be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to eve-
ry State; because it is conformable to the standard already estab-
lished, or which may be established by the State itself. It will be safe 
to the United States; because, being fixed by the State Constitutions, 
it is not alterable by the State Governments . . . . 118 
This passage presents persuasive evidence of the meaning of the right to vote 
as protected by Article I, Section 2, suggesting that: (1) the right to vote in 
state and federal elections must exist because it is the hallmark of a republican 
form of government; (2) there is no uniform right of suffrage at the federal lev-
el, and the right varies by state; and (3) the state and federal constitutions limit 
the ability of state governments to alter the right to vote through ordinary legis-
lative processes.119 
From The Federalist No. 52, it is evident that Madison believed that it 
was important to preserve voting rights upon ratification, a view that is bol-
stered by the debate in the constitutional convention over whether the qualifi-
cations of federal electors should be enumerated in the Constitution.120 This 
proposal was rejected because, according to James Wilson, “[i]t was difficult 
to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States.”121 Wilson further 
                                                                                                                           
in this constitution shall deprive a citizen of any state of the benefit of the bill of rights established by 
the constitution of the state in which he shall reside . . . .”). 
 118 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 13, at 182–83. 
 119 See id. 
 120 See id.; JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 351 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott 
eds., 2007) (debate over whether qualifications of federal electors should be included in the Constitu-
tion). 
 121 MADISON, supra note 120, at 351 (comments of James Wilson). But see id. at 352 (comments 
of John Dickenson) (arguing that freeholders are “the best guardians of liberty”). 
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observed that, “it would be very hard [and] disagreeable for the same persons 
at the same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be 
excluded from a vote for those in the Nat[ional] Legislature.”122 Other dele-
gates emphasized concerns about disqualifying voters who would otherwise be 
eligible to vote under state law, with some opining that this development could 
lead the people to ultimately reject the proposed constitution.123 As Oliver 
Ellsworth noted, “[t]he people will not readily subscribe to the Nat[ional] Con-
stitution if it should subject them to be disenfranchised. The States are the best 
Judges of the circumstances [and] temper of their own people.”124 George Ma-
son similarly worried, “what will the people there say, if they should be disen-
franchised. A power to alter the qualifications would be a dangerous power in 
the hands of the [Federal] Legislature.”125 
Some delegates were against state control over voter qualifications be-
cause they were distrustful of the states’ ability to regulate federal elections.126 
Gouverneur Morris argued that federal and state voter qualifications need not 
be identical because “[t]he people are accustomed to [disparate qualification 
standards] and not dissatisfied with it, in the several of the States” because in 
“some the qualifications are different for the choice of the Gov[erno]r [and] 
Representatives; In others for different Houses of the Legislature.”127 Indeed, 
Morris was more uncomfortable with a proposal that would “make[] the quali-
fications of the Nat[ional] Legislature depend on the will of the States” than 
the potential lack of uniformity among federal and state qualifications.128  
Yet few of these delegates could dispute that the right to vote was already 
strongly protected by state constitutions, making any proposal that would alter 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Id. at 351. 
 123 See id. at 354. Benjamin Franklin argued that he did not think “the elected had any right in any 
case to narrow the privileges of electors” because the elected often used subterfuge to circumscribe 
the right to vote. As James Madison described in his notes: 
He [Franklin] quoted as arbitrary the British Statute setting forth the danger of tumultu-
ous meetings, and under that pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons having 
freeholds of a certain value; observing that this Statute was soon followed by another 
under the succeeding Parliam[en]t subjecting the people who had no votes to peculiar 
labors & hardships. He was persuaded also that such a restriction as was proposed 
would give great uneasiness in the populous States. The sons of a substantial farmer, 
not being themselves freeholders, would not be pleased at being disenfranchised, and 
there are a great many persons of that description. 
Id. 
 124 Id. at 351 (comments of Oliver Ellsworth). 
 125 Id. (comments of George Mason). 
 126 See MADISON, supra note 120, at 351 (comments of Gouverneur Morris). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
2015] The Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I 183 
this situation controversial.129 For example, some delegates proposed freehold 
requirements for federal electors, but others believed that imposing a property 
restriction could derail ratification.130 Freehold requirements were not a pre-
requisite to voting in all states.131 Moreover, critics of this approach argued 
that limiting the right to vote to property holders was too “British,” and the 
people would rebel against creating a system that mimicked the one that they 
had repudiated.132 Others worried less about adopting overtly British standards, 
and were more concerned about the possibility of corruption and bribery 
should the right to vote be extended to the masses.133 Ultimately, a majority of 
the delegates decided to let states determine voter qualifications for federal 
elections because outlining federal criteria would explicitly disenfranchise vot-
                                                                                                                           
 129 Id. (comments of Oliver Ellsworth) (arguing that “[t]he right of suffrage was a tender point, 
and strongly guarded by most of the State Constitutions”); see, e.g., GA. CONST. art. 12 (1777) (“Eve-
ry person absenting himself from an election, and shall neglect to give in his or their ballot . . . shall be 
subject to a penalty not exceeding five pounds.”); MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, § 5 (1776) 
(“[E]lections ought to be free and frequent, and every man, having property in, a common interest 
with, and an attachment to the community, ought to have a right of suffrage.”). Other states also had 
provisions for “free and fair elections.” See, e.g., MASS. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 9 (1780); 
N.H. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1784). 
 130 See MADISON, supra note 120, at 352 (comments of Oliver Ellsworth). Oliver Ellsworth 
stated: 
How shall the freehold be defined? Ought not every man who pays a tax, to vote for the 
representative who is to levy & dispose of his money? Shall the wealthy merchants & 
manufacturers, who will bear a full share of the public burdens be not allowed a voice 
in the imposition of them—taxation and representation ought to go together. 
Id. 
 131 See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 4 (1776) (incorporating by reference 7 Geo. II, § 2 (1733)) (re-
quiring that electors “be a freeholder” or “be otherwise worth Forty Pounds of lawful money”); N.Y. 
CONST. art. VII (1777) (requiring electors to either be a freeholder or “have rented a tenement therein 
of the yearly value of forty shillings”); FUNDAMENTAL ORDERS OF CONN. (1639) (providing that 
“choice shall be made by all that are admitted freemen”). 
 132 MADISON, supra note 120, at 353 (comments of George Mason). George Mason stated: 
We all feel too strongly the remains of antient prejudices, and view things too much 
through a British medium. A Freehold is the qualification in England, and hence it is 
imagined to be the only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was that every man 
having evidence of attachment to & permanent common interest with the Society ought 
to share in all its rights & privileges. 
Id.; see also VA. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5 (1776) (requiring only that men have “sufficient evidence 
of permanent common interest . . . with the community”). 
 133 See MADISON, supra note 120, at 353–54 (comments of James Madison) (arguing that “[a] 
very small proportion of the Representatives [in England] are chosen by freeholders. The greatest part 
are chosen by the Cities and boroughs, in many of which the qualification of suffrage is as low as it is 
in any one of the U.S.,” but noting that “it was in the boroughs and Cities . . . that bribery most pre-
vailed”). But see id. at 355 (comments of Nathaniel Ghorum) (disputing that the “[c]ities & large 
towns are . . . the seat of Crown influence & corruption” and arguing that the “[t]he elections in Phila-
delphia, New York & Boston where the Merchants, & Mechanics vote are at least as good as those 
made by freeholders only”). 
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ers otherwise qualified to vote under state law, thereby undermining passage of 
the new Constitution.134 
The ratification debates further corroborate that the purpose of the Voter 
Qualification Clause of Article I was to avoid disenfranchising eligible voters. 
During the debates, opponents criticized various provisions of the proposed 
Constitution (such as a lack of annual elections for any federal offices) that, 
although not explicitly restricting the right to vote, could have had the effect of 
abridging state-granted voting rights.135 Many viewed the rejection of annual 
elections to be a subversion of the people’s right to vote, equivalent to a free-
hold requirement or outright vote denial.136 A letter appeared in the Independ-
ent Gazetteer in November 1787, arguing that, under the proposed Constitu-
tion, “[a]nnual Elections are abolished, and the people are not to re-assume 
their rights until the expiration of two, four and six years.”137 Supporters of the 
Constitution conceded that “the doctrine of frequent elections has been sancti-
fied by antiquity,” but maintained that longer terms of office are necessary at 
the federal level because “[i]t is not by riding post to and from Congress, that a 
man can acquire a just knowledge of the true interests of the union.”138 Noah 
Webster similarly rejected the argument that biennial elections undermined the 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Id. at 354 (comments of John Rutledge) (arguing that “restraining the right of suffrage to the 
freeholders a very unadvised [idea]” because it “would create division among the people and make 
enemies of all those who should be excluded”); see also id. at 351 (comments of George Mason) (not-
ing that “[e]ight or nine States have extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders”). 
135 See, e.g., “Cato,” Can an American Be a Tyrant? On the Great Powers of the Presidency, 
the Vagueness of the Constitution, and the Dangers of Congress, N.Y. J., Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted in 
1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 401 [hereinafter Cato, Can an American Be a 
Tyrant?]; Reply to Wilson’s Speech, an Officer of the Late Continental Army (William Findley?), 
INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Nov. 6, 1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
13, at 100. 
 136 See Cato, Can an American be a Tyrant?, supra note 135, at 401 (“The most general objec-
tions to the first article [which comprises the election of the house of representatives and the senate], 
are that biennial elections for representatives are a departure from the safe democratic principles of 
annual ones.”). 
 137 See Reply to Wilson’s Speech, an Officer of the Late Continental Army (William Findley?), 
INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Nov. 6, 1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
13, at 100. 
 138 Fisher Ames on Biennial Elections and on the Volcano of Democracy, Jan. 15, 1788, reprinted 
in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 891–95 (arguing that “Biennial elections [are] 
. . . an essential security to liberty” because it allows time for “reflection and information” so as to 
discourage people from “nourish[ing] factions in their bosom”); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James 
Madison), reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 189 (“No man can be a 
competent legislator who does not add . . . a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he 
is to legislate . . . part [of which] can only be attained . . . by actual experience in the station which 
requires the use of it.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 118, at 184–
85 (drawing on the history of British elections, where election frequency went from every seven years 
to every three; Irish elections, which “were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown”; and 
elections in the colonies, which “varied for one to seven years,” in order to show that “biennial elec-
tions under the federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the house 
of representatives on their constituents”). 
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right to vote, arguing that the proposed timing of federal elections do not dis-
turb the underlying rights of the people because the “only barrier against tyr-
anny . . . is the election of Legislators by the yeomanry of the State. Preserve 
that, and every privilege is safe.”139 
The Elections Clause was another point of contention during the ratifica-
tion debates, with critics arguing that this provision gave Congress too much 
authority over House and Senate elections.140 Brutus, a well-known opponent 
of the Constitution, criticized the Clause for usurping the people’s authority:  
Had the power of regulating elections been left under the direction 
of the state legislatures, where the people are not only nominally but 
substantially represented, it would have been secure; but if it was 
taken out of their hands, it surely ought to have been fixed on such a 
basis as to have put it out of the power of the federal legislature to 
deprive the people of it by law.141  
Similarly, William Findley contended that the Clause was proof of a conspira-
cy to consolidate the states, “for there cannot be two powers employed at the 
same time in regulating the same elections.”142 The authority given to Con-
gress under the Elections Clause, combined with the lack of annual elections, 
convinced many opponents of the Constitution that the states and their citizens 
no longer had control over the electoral process.143 
                                                                                                                           
 139 “America” (Noah Webster), Reply to the Pennsylvania Minority, Dec. 31, 1787, reprinted in 1 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 554–55 (arguing that “the right of election is above 
[Congress’s] control: it must remain in the people, and be exercised once in two, four or six years”). 
 140 See “Agrippa” (James Winthrop), Amend the Articles of Confederation or Amend the Consti-
tution? Fourteen Conditions for Accepting the Constitution, MASS. GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted 
in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 158 (“Congress shall have no power to alter 
the time, place or manner of elections, nor any authority over elections, otherwise than by fining such 
state as shall neglect to send its representatives or senators . . . . ”); Letter of John Spencer to James 
Madison, Enclosing John Leland’s Objections, Feb. 28, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 13, at 268 (“The time place & Manner of chusing the Members of the Lower 
house is intirely at the Mercy of Congress, if they Appoint Pepin or Japan, or their ten Miles Square 
for the place, no man can help it.”); see also Resolution of Virginia, June 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE 
ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 564 (“Congress shall not alter, modify, or interfere in the 
times, places, or manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, or either of them, 
except when the Legislature of any state shall neglect, refuse, or be disabled by invasion or rebellion 
to prescribe the same.”); Resolution of New York, July 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 13, at 541 (same); Resolution of North Carolina, Aug. 1788, reprinted in 2 DE-
BATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 571 (same). 
 141 Brutus, Fair Representation Is the Great Desideratum in Politics, N.Y. JOURNAL, Nov. 29, 
1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 428–29 (arguing that through 
the “clause the right of election itself, is, in a great measure, transferred from the people to their rul-
ers”). 
 142 William Findley on the Constitution as a Plan for National Consolidation, Dec. 1, 1787, re-
printed in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 818–19. 
 143 See, e.g., Robert Whitehall’s Amendments and the Final Vote, Dec. 12, 1787, reprinted in 1 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 873 (circulating a petition of proposed constitu-
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In response to these critiques, some people pointed out that the right to 
vote in House elections would remain a creature of state law post-ratification 
to illustrate that the federal government would be dependent upon the contin-
ued existence of the states.144 In The Federalist No. 45, for example, James 
Madison observed that “[e]ven the House of Representatives, though drawn 
immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the influence of 
that class of men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an 
election into the State Legislature.”145 Similarly, a supporter of the Constitu-
tion calling himself “A Landholder” wrote a spirited defense in The Connecti-
cut Courant, noting that, among the advantages of the new government: 
The federal representatives are to be chosen by the votes of the peo-
ple. Every freeman is an elector. The same qualifications which ena-
ble you to vote for state representatives, give you a federal voice. It is 
a right you cannot lose, unless you first annihilate the state legislature, 
and declare yourselves incapable of electing, which is a degree of in-
fatuation improbable as a second deluge to drown the world.146 
As this Part illustrates, Article I, Section 2 incorporated the substantive 
versions of the right to vote enshrined in state constitutions to avoid wide-
spread disenfranchisement, to spur ratification, and most importantly, to give 
the states a role in the composition of the new government.147 It is this under-
standing of the right to vote, derived almost entirely from state law, that should 
drive the current judicial interpretation of the states’ authority over elections.148 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE “ALTER OR ABOLISH” POWER  
AND THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
Although the scope of voting rights varies by state, one of the key as-
sumptions underlying the Voter Qualifications Clause was that making federal 
voting rights dependent upon state law would result in more, not less, political 
                                                                                                                           
tional amendments, including one providing that “elections shall remain free . . . and that the several 
states shall have power to regulate the elections for senators and representatives, without being con-
trouled [sic] either directly or indirectly by any interference on the part of Congress, and that elections 
of representatives be annual”); A Columbian Patriot [Mercy Otis Warren], Observations on the Con-
stitution, Feb. 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 290 (criticizing 
the lack of annual elections). 
 144 See supra notes 116–143 and accompanying text. 
 145 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 13, at 103–04. 
 146 “A Landholder” (Oliver Ellsworth), Reply to Elbridge Gerry, CONN. COURANT, Nov. 26, 
1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 236–37 (arguing that “State 
representation and government is the very basis of the congressional power proposed”). 
 147 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 548–50 (1954). 
 148 See supra notes 91–116 and accompanying text. 
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participation. The original understanding of the text was that federal voting 
rights would be defined by state substantive law, but as this Part shows, the 
framers also assumed that voter participation in House elections would be con-
sistent with the political norms present in the states.149 As James Madison not-
ed in The Federalist No. 39, “[t]he house of representatives will derive its 
powers from the people of America, and the people will be represented in the 
same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the Legislature of a 
particular State.”150 Arguably, the “alter or abolish” power is one of the best 
indications of what citizen political participation and state political norms 
looked like at the founding, given that this authority was the primary mecha-
nism that the people used to express their sovereignty until well into the nine-
teenth century.151 The people used the “alter or abolish” power to displace state 
laws with which they disagreed;152 to hold constitutional conventions inde-
pendent of the legislature;153 to revise their state constitutions without official 
ratification;154 and to form new states.155 
                                                                                                                           
 149 Wayne Logan has made a similar argument in the criminal law context. See, e.g., Wayne A. 
Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and the Applicability of Federal 
Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 146 (2009) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment 
right to be free of illegal search and seizure often turns on state norms despite the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the right as national in character); Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and 
Lower Courts Disagree on Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014) (pushing back on the Supreme Court’s assumption that federal rights are uniform). 
 150 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 13, at 30. 
 151 See Fritz, supra note 17, at 262. As Fritz observed: 
State constitutionalism springs from our colonial inheritance, but underwent a uniquely 
American shift from a belief in a right of revolution based in natural law to the notion 
of a central role of ‘the people’ as the ultimate sovereign. The people’s role found ex-
pression in written constitutions and took shape in the constitutional transformation 
from the conventional right of revolution to the right of the people to alter or abolish the 
constitutional order under which they chose to be governed. 
Id. 
 152 See generally Larry D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 153 Richard L. Mumford, Constitutional Development in the State of Delaware, 1776–1897, at 
108–09 (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Delaware) (on file with author) (noting that 
Delaware’s 1776 Constitution “did not include any mode of calling a convention [but] [i]t was called 
on the assumption that the people retained an inherent right to change their frame of government”). 
 154 See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside of Article 
V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1051–52 (1988) (arguing that Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Mary-
land legally ratified the U.S. Constitution—even though its adoption effectuated a change to their 
existing state constitutions by a procedure not explicitly mentioned in those documents—because the 
natural right to alter or abolish government gave “a bare majority of the People . . . a legal right to 
amend their constitution” outside of its formal strictures); Christian G. Fritz, Fallacies of American 
Constitutionalism, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1327, 1352 (2004) (“Studies have long documented numerous 
instances—if not a tendency toward—constitutional revision bypassing established constitutional 
procedures.”). 
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Although there is an ongoing debate over whether the U.S. Constitution 
rejected the “alter or abolish” authority that served as the legal basis for the 
colonists’ split with Great Britain,156 this right remained vibrant in the states 
during the post-Revolutionary War era.157 The mechanisms through which the 
people, as collective sovereign, could express their will varied in the states, 
ranging from the formal use of procedural mechanisms; the informal use of the 
“alter or abolish” authority; or some variation of both.158 For example, the fed-
eral government and some state governments required that their constitutions 
be amended only by way of formal procedures.159 Other state governments 
were not as formalistic, delegating significant authority to the people to revise 
                                                                                                                           
 155 See JAMES QUAYLE DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS: FROM 1776 TO 
THE END OF THE YEAR 1914, at 50 (1915) (noting that, in eight of the states that entered the union 
between 1831 and 1860, “the inhabitants, in their eagerness for statehood, called a convention on their 
own account and then petitioned congress for admission”); Fritz, supra note 154, at 1352 (“[O]nly one 
of the seven constitutions that formed states out of the Northwest Territory between 1801 and 1830 
was [submitted to a constitutional convention and] ratified by the people” and “of the 119 constitu-
tions created between 1776 and 1900, 45 constitutions (roughly 38%) were adopted without [constitu-
tional convention and] popular ratification . . . .”). 
 156 See Amar, supra note 154, at 1050–51 (arguing that Article V is a nonexclusive means of 
amending the Constitution because the people still retain their right to alter or abolish the govern-
ment); see also CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S CON-
STITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 135 (2009) (“The federal Framers did not include 
alter or abolish language in the federal Constitution. Moreover, they rejected the assumption that the 
sovereign source creating the constitution retained an inherent right of revision. The Framers’ position 
dramatically departed from an expansive view of the people’s sovereignty.”); supra note 135–136 and 
accompanying text. But see Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and 
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 130 (1996) (criticizing Amar for overlooking 
“the democracy restraining nature of the Constitution” in trying to draw parallels between Article V 
and the traditional understanding of the alter or abolish power). 
 157 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 158 Compare GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
1789–1815, at 31 (2009) (“In addition to correcting the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, 
the Constitution was intended to restrain the excesses of democracy and protect minority rights from 
overbearing majorities in the state legislatures.”), with Fritz, supra note 154, at 1359: 
[W]e assume from Wood’s description of the rise of a more constrained proceduralism 
[through the adoption of Article V] that the constitutionalism of the early revolutionary 
period has been dead for over two centuries. But the . . . records of nearly a hundred 
constitutional conventions after 1787 belie the assumption that non-procedural constitu-
tionalism died with the birth of the Federal Constitution. . . . In the years following the 
Constitution’s adoption, Americans continued to dispute, both at the federal and state 
level, whether constitutional procedures could limit the powers of the sovereign—the 
people—who created those constitutions. 
Fritz, supra note 154, at 1359. 
 159 See Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. L. 
REV. 155, 178 (1997) (“Article V can be seen as the Constitution writ small [because] [i]t affirms the 
right of the people to alter or abolish their government . . . [but] the institutional procedures and su-
permajority requirements help guarantee that reason and not passion guide the sovereign people.”). 
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their state constitutions at will.160 Five of the eleven states that drafted consti-
tutions during the Revolutionary War included “alter or abolish” provisions,161 
and many states adopted these provisions upon entry into the union post-
ratification. 
However, missing from this narrative is a discussion of how, over the 
course of the nineteenth century, expanded access to the franchise helped 
bridge the gap between the nonprocedural lawmaking of the people’s “alter or 
abolish” authority and formal amendment procedures like Article V. As this 
Part shows, Reconstruction-era disputes over voting rights and the legal status 
of the former confederate states ultimately led to the domestication of state 
“alter or abolish” provisions, a process that provided an opening for the right 
to vote to become the medium for expressing the people’s sovereign authority 
outside of the strictures of formal constitutional amendment.162 
Unlike the “alter or abolish” authority, voting minimized the risk of polit-
ical disruption, mob action, and violent regime overthrow while preserving the 
people’s ability to influence lawmaking and governance.163 Through elections, 
the people could remove elected officials, vote on referendum and ballot initia-
tives, and call for state constitutional conventions. Because the Voter Qualifi-
cations Clause links federal voting rights to participation in state elections, this 
provision also incorporates these state level norms about the nature of the right 
to vote as the successor to the “alter or abolish” power and, as such, an expres-
sion of popular sovereignty. 
A. The Influence of Political Rights on the “Alter or Abolish” 
Authority During the Founding and Antebellum Eras 
The structure of the federal government as described by the U.S. Consti-
tution is not populist in the same way as state governments. In particular, the 
                                                                                                                           
 160 State constitutions at the founding constantly evolved because drafters looked to the constitu-
tions of sister states in writing, revising, and creating their own constitutions. See Marsha L. Baum & 
Christian G. Fritz, American Constitution-Making: The Neglected State Constitutional Sources, 27 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 199, 207–08 (2000) (“Compilations [of existing state constitutions] facilitated 
the first wave of constitution-making after the Revolution and produced an enduring trait of American 
constitution-making: a clear instinct for comparison, modeling, and borrowing. Newspapers regularly 
published the texts of state constitutions, which were subjected to close analysis and scrutiny by revo-
lutionary constitution-makers.”); see also JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRADITION 3 (2006) (“[T]he drafters of the federal Constitution established a rigid amendment and 
revision process, [but] state convention delegates have almost uniformly rejected this approach and 
adopted relatively flexible procedures for constitutional change . . . .”). 
 161 FRITZ, supra note 156, at 24. 
 162 For a similar analogy, see Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
347, 351 (2010) (arguing that presidential impeachment is the “domestication of assassination” be-
cause “[t]he Constitution’s impeachment procedures make the removal of the chief magistrate less 
violent, less disruptive, and less error-prone than assassination”). 
 163 See Amar, supra note 17, at 463. 
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text limits the direct involvement of the people to selecting members of the 
House of Representatives (and later, the Senate).164 The Constitution’s division 
of power among the federal government, the states, and the people reflects the 
selective use of popular sovereignty to validate the new powers of the national 
government while preserving majoritarianism at the state level.165 Given the 
Constitution’s structure, it is unsurprising that there is no mechanism for direct 
democracy at the federal level nor does the Constitution contain an “alter or 
abolish” provision similar to those that existed in state constitutions during the 
founding. 
Nevertheless, the people’s right to “alter or abolish” their government 
persisted in the states.166 For example, the state that later became Vermont, re-
lying on the “alter or abolish” authority, attempted to break away from New 
York in 1777, but leaders from the Continental Congress rejected this attempt 
as “untenable.”167 Many state leaders agreed that this authority could be dan-
gerous, but did not believe they had the authority to eliminate the “alter or 
abolish” power outright because of its connection to the “right of revolution” 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (stating that the House of Representatives shall be composed of 
members chosen “by the People of the several States,” but delegating to states the responsibility of 
choosing the qualifications of the electors); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (constraining the people’s authority 
over elections by delegating to each house of Congress the power to be the “Judge of the Elections, 
Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members”); see also A. JAMES REICHLEY, THE LIFE OF THE 
PARTIES 29, 34 (1992) (describing how the electors, not voters, select the President of the United 
States, which was a compromise between election by popular vote and selection by Congress). 
 165 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1436 (1987) 
(“[A]s sovereign, the People need not wield day-to-day power themselves, but could act through 
agents on whom they conferred limited powers . . . . So long as the People at all times retained the 
ability to revoke or modify their delegations, such agency relationships were in no sense a surrender 
or division of ultimate sovereignty.”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 21 
(1993) (“[The framers] attempted to carry forward the classical republican belief in virtue . . . but to 
do so in a way that responded realistically, not romantically, to likely difficulties in the real world of 
political life . . . . We might understand the Constitution as a complex set of precommitment strate-
gies, through which the citizenry creates institutional arrangements to protect against political self-
interest, factionalism, failures in representation, myopia, and other predictable problems in democratic 
governance . . . .”). 
 166 See Aaron T. Knapp, Law’s Revolutionary: James Wilson and the Birth of American Jurispru-
dence, 29 J.L. & POL. 189, 238 (2014). 
 167 FRITZ, supra note 156, at 55 (noting that “Americans could ‘alter or abolish’ their govern-
ments but congressional leaders faced a quandary” because “maintaining the status quo of newly es-
tablished American governments was a more pressing concern than extending the logic of the Revolu-
tion’s principles that might challenge those governments”). Shay’s Rebellion, an armed uprising in 
Massachusetts in 1786 over the post-Revolutionary War economic depression, also raised concerns 
about the citizens’ authority to alter or abolish government, leading revolutionary leaders to take a 
different view regarding the scope of this authority. See Knapp, supra note 166, at 238 (“In the decade 
after Independence, the intellectual tides increasingly turned against the more radical articulations of 
popular power that had debuted in the heady days of revolution—a trend that began as early as 1778 
and which culminated in an oft-expressed fear of anarchy in the wake of Shay’s Rebellion.”). 
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in the Declaration of Independence.168 Instead, some post-1776 state constitu-
tions circumscribed this authority by adding mechanisms by which state con-
stitutions could be formally amended.169 
The adoption of the Guarantee Clause in 1787 necessitated further chang-
es to the natural right to “alter or abolish” state government. The requirement 
of republicanism for state governments, although ill-defined during the found-
ing era, arguably was a repudiation of the violence that had accompanied tradi-
tional exercises of this power.170 Republicanism, in the view of some framers, 
required citizen political participation and eschewed violent overthrow of the 
government, further validating the turn away from an “alter or abolish” power 
centered in violence to one premised on political rights.171 As Roger Sherman 
argued during the ratification debates, a republican government is one that has 
three branches of government, including legislative and executive branches 
determined “by periodical elections, agreeable to an established constitution; 
and that what especially denominates it a republic is its dependence on the 
public or the people at large, without hereditary powers,” a view that appeared 
to be fairly common during this period.172 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See Amar, supra note 154, at 1050 (describing the people’s alter or abolish authority as an 
“inalienable legal right—that is, a right that [the people] were incapable of waiving, even if they 
tried”). 
 169 FRITZ, supra note 156, at 242 (“With one exception, every state between 1820 and 1842 hold-
ing a constitutional convention inserted a provision for amendment if one did not already exist in its 
constitution.”). 
 170 According to William Wiecek, there was very little consensus about what the Guarantee 
Clause of Article IV actually required in order for a government to be “republican.” WIECEK, supra 
note 13, at 13. Wiecek noted: 
If the word [Republican] did have a definable meaning it probably had several, and they 
may have been vague, ambiguous, multifarious, or conflicting . . . . A republic might 
have been the antithesis of a monarchy or an aristocracy, yet [John] Adams and others 
found no difficulty in imagining monarchic or aristocratic republics. Some of the fram-
ers and their contemporaries expected the concept of republican government to change 
over time, hopefully perfecting the experiment begun by the Revolution. 
Id.; see also MADISON, supra note 120, at 353 (comments of James Madison) (describing the right to 
vote as “one of the fundamental articles of republican Government”). 
 171 See MADISON, supra note 120, at 280 (comments of James Wilson) (arguing that the Guaran-
tee Clause “secure[d] the States ag[ain]st dangerous commotions, insurrections and rebellions”). 
Countless law review articles have been written on what constitutes a republican form of government, 
and many scholars agree that republicanism requires that states extend political rights to their citizens. 
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 122–23 (1980) (noting that the Guarantee 
Clause could be the source of the Court’s voting rights jurisprudence); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central 
Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator 
Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749 (1994) (arguing that republican government requires that “the 
structure of day-to-day government—the Constitution—be derived from ‘the People’ and be legally 
alterable by a ‘majority’ of them”). 
 172 Letter from Roger Sherman to John Adams, July 20, 1789, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 
437 (C. Adams ed., 1856); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 150, at 27 (de-
fining a republican government as “a government which derives all of its powers directly or indirectly 
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The rejection of a violent “alter or abolish” power, though a firmly en-
trenched natural right, also corresponded to discussions in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries about whether voting was a natural right.173 Increased bal-
lot access and more expansive voting rights in the states predictably influenced 
eighteenth and nineteenth century debates over the validity of the people’s “al-
ter or abolish” authority.174 The framers’ decision to link voter qualifications 
for state and federal elections made it inevitable that the democratic tide in 
most states would bleed over into the federal realm, and as discussed in Part II, 
many of the delegates actually expected and welcomed this outcome.175 As 
Alexander Keyssar argued in his seminal study of the right to vote, “The idea 
that voting was a right, even a natural right, had become increasingly wide-
spread in the eighteenth century (its ancestry dated to antiquity) and was em-
braced by many small farmers and artisans, as well as by the most radical lead-
ers of the revolution such as Franklin, Thomas Young of Pennsylvania, and 
Ethan Allen of Vermont.”176  
Although the concept of voting as a natural right did not become the dom-
inant view,177 these discussions introduced the idea that the act of voting is an 
expression of popular sovereignty. Indeed, these debates about who should 
have access to the ballot significantly influenced the political landscape post-
ratification.178 Notably, states expanded voting rights in the first half of the 
nineteenth century despite the lack of firm support in natural rights theory.179 
                                                                                                                           
from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleas-
ure, for a limited period, or during good behavior”); see also WIECEK, supra note 13, at 17 (“The 
negative senses of ‘republican’ that is nonmonarchical and nonaristocratic commanded the assent of 
most Americans in 1787. Beyond this it is unsafe to generalize about the precise meaning of the 
term.”). 
173 KEYSSAR, supra note 21, at 12. 
 174 See KRAMER, supra note 152, at 109 (noting that citizen demands to “control the course of 
government” was reflected in “expanded suffrage and higher voter turnout”). 
 175 See supra notes 120–128 and accompanying text. 
 176 KEYSSAR, supra note 21, at 12; see also MADISON, supra note 120, at 354 (comments of Ben-
jamin Franklin) (arguing that “the elected [did not have] any right in any case to narrow the privileges 
of electors”). 
 177 See KEYSSAR, supra note 21, at 12 (discussing how the notion of voting as a natural right had 
gained a foothold in post-revolutionary America because “it meshed well with the Lockean political 
theory popular in eighteenth-century America, it had a clear antimonarchical thrust, and it had the 
virtue of simplicity,” but such arguments never became dominant because “there was no way to argue 
that voting was a . . . natural right without opening Pandora’s box”). The Supreme Court implicitly 
rejected the natural right argument in Luther v. Borden, which is famous for holding that the power to 
determine whether a state government has been lawfully established is a political question. See 48 
U.S. 1, 42 (1849). The case also involved a challenge to the voting provisions of the Rhode Island 
Constitution because, according to the petitioners, the property requirements excluded half the state’s 
population of white males from voting.  
 178 See infra notes 179–201 and accompanying text. 
 179 See CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 1760–
1860, at vii, 42 (1960). 
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This change was prompted by the shrinking electorate,180 but the expansion of 
the voter base was also a foreseeable consequence of granting the people broad 
authority to choose which candidates would be on the ballot.181 Although 
many states retained freehold requirements for voters in the early decades of 
the nineteenth century,182 state officials were quite liberal in allowing almost 
anyone to run for office in both state and federal elections.183 For example, 
New Jersey law provided that “it shall . . . be lawful for every Inhabitant of this 
State, who is or shall be qualified to vote for Members of the State Legislature, 
to nominate four Candidates to the Choice of the People, as Representatives in 
the said Congress of the United States, by writing on one Ticket or Piece of 
Paper the Names of four Persons . . . at least thirty Days previous to the Day of 
Election . . . .”184 Thus, New Jersey limited who could vote, but not who could 
be a candidate so long as the individual met the age, residency, and citizenship 
requirements of the U.S. Constitution.185 Notably, the New Jersey Constitution 
of 1776 required its legislators to be freeholders, but its 1787 election law, 
adopted to implemented the newly ratified Constitution, did not impose this 
requirement on House and Senate candidates.186 
Similarly, New York’s election law divided the state into six districts and 
gave the people in each district the authority to elect one representative with-
out articulating any constraints on who could be nominated outside of those 
criteria specifically mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.187 Connecticut like-
wise provided that “each [Freeman shall] give his Votes or Suffrages for a 
number not exceeding twelve Persons whom he Judges Qualified to stand in 
nomination for Representatives of the People of this State to the Congress of 
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the United States.”188 Delaware also placed few constraints on who can be 
nominated for Congress, allowing voters to name “two persons” for the one 
congressional seat, subject only to the limitation that “one of whom at least 
shall not be an Inhabitant of the same County with themselves.”189 Virginia, by 
contrast, was one of the more restrictive states and allowed voters to name one 
person for the office so long as that person was “a freeholder and . . . a bona 
fide resident for twelve months.”190 
This virtually unfettered ability to nominate candidates “of the people,” 
once conceived as an aspect of the people’s sovereign authority,191 made the 
slide toward liberal access to the ballot inevitable. The change was gradual at 
first, with Delaware eliminating its property qualification for voting in 1792 
and Maryland right after the turn of the century.192 Then, Massachusetts and 
New York allowed broader access to the ballot in the 1820s, with Virginia and 
North Carolina doing the same in the 1850s.193 Between 1830 and 1855, six 
states abolished the poll tax,194 and “none of the new states admitted to the un-
ion after 1790 adopted mandatory property requirements in their original con-
stitutions.”195 In turn, state legislatures compelled municipalities to adopt more 
liberal voting regulations for local elections, leading to a convergence between 
state and local regulations that governed voter qualifications by the 1850s.196 
The expansion of the franchise coincided with the rise of mass political 
parties in the 1820s, and organized politics made it more likely that political 
rights could facilitate the people’s sovereign authority.197 The competition be-
tween the political parties led to additional voting reforms, which had become 
a partisan political issue during this time.198 These reforms led to the election 
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of more populous candidates such as Andrew Jackson, who ended the reign of 
the founding-era aristocracy.199 Voting’s evolution from a tool of the landed 
gentry to one dominated by the masses provided an answer to the perplexing 
question of “how could the people act as one, like a traditional sovereign” 
without violence.200 Over the next several decades, the right of the people to 
alter or abolish their governments “became domesticated and legalized” in 
each of the colonies, where “[b]allots would replace bullets.”201 
B. Cementing a New Understanding of “Alter or Abolish”: The Civil War 
and Reconstruction-Era State Constitutions 
The people’s authority to “alter or abolish” their state governments was 
officially relegated to the political processes during the Reconstruction era, 
creating an enduring link between this authority and the right to vote.202 The 
Civil War forced elected officials to confront the constitutionality of state “al-
ter or abolish” provisions because the confederate states relied on this authority 
as one of the main legal arguments justifying secession.203 The confederacy 
asserted that the U.S. Constitution was a compact that the federal government 
breached due to its failure to allow slavery in more of the territories acquired 
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in the first half of the nineteenth century,204 and that the non-slave holding 
states breached due to their refusal to return fugitive slaves.205 
The argument that the states could secede based on contract theory often 
was followed by the claim that all states have an inherent, natural right to over-
throw the federal government.206 An explicit right of the people to “alter or 
abolish” the government appeared in six of the eleven confederate state consti-
tutions prior to the Civil War, as well as in the constitutions of the contested 
border states of Missouri and Kentucky.207 Jefferson Davis framed secession as 
not only natural, but at least partially derived from the Declaration of Inde-
pendence: 
Our present political position has been achieved in a manner unprece-
dented in the history of nations. It illustrates the American idea that 
governments rest on the consent of the governed, and that it is the 
right of the people to alter or abolish them at will whenever they be-
come destructive of the ends for which they were established. . . . In 
this [the confederate states] merely asserted the right which the Decla-
ration of Independence of July 4, 1776, defined to be “inalienable.”208 
It was this argument, along with the pressure to take a side once the war began, 
that pushed the last few southern states to join the confederacy.209 Historian 
William Freehling argues that the right to “alter or abolish” government was 
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absolutely essential in convincing Virginia and the rest of the somewhat reluc-
tant southern states that they too had to secede once the war began: 
Virginia and the whole Upper South needed to be shoved . . . . Only 
when Lincoln called up the troops, to destroy the people of a state’s 
alleged right to withdraw their consent, did disunion consume Vir-
ginia. William Rives, for example, led the Central Confederacy 
movement. But after Lincoln summoned the troops, Rives became a 
Southern Confederate partisan. “Our justification now,” soared 
Rives, lies “in the principles of the Declaration of American Inde-
pendence”—in the right to throw off a “government, which no long-
er stands upon the only legitimate foundation, the consent of the 
governed, but seeks to rule by the sword.” . . . [T]he majority of 
Southerners . . . rejected Lower South Separatists’ case for ripping 
apart the nation over Lincoln’s menace to slavery. But Lincoln’s 
trampling down white men’s right to consent was another matter. 210 
Thus, this argument, rooted in the Declaration of Independence, convinced 
some moderately pro-slavery states to support secession even though they 
were not otherwise swayed by claims of breach of contract or protecting the 
property rights of slave-owners as justification for outright rebellion.211 As the 
Mississippi declaration of secession put it, “[f]or far less cause . . . our fathers 
separated from the Crown of England.”212 
Given this, Republicans in Congress focused their legislative efforts in the 
immediate aftermath of the war on mitigating the natural right to “alter or abol-
ish” government and ensuring that southern states granted African-Americans 
the right to vote to prevent ex-confederates from overthrowing the new south-
ern regimes.213 Congress used its authority under the Guarantee Clause to sus-
pend southern governments that deprived African-Americans of civil and polit-
ical rights as non-republican in form.214 Constitutional conventions, spear-
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headed by Republicans, amended “alter or abolish” provisions in state consti-
tutions and barred ex-confederates from assuming elected office.215 As a result, 
states that had “alter or abolish” clauses prior to the war, such as Arkansas, Al-
abama, Texas, and Florida, instituted provisions that were less far reaching 
than their predecessors of the 1830s while increasing political protections in 
the post-war constitutions.216 African-American suffrage was the most im-
portant issue at the time,217 and voting became a natural replacement for the 
more robust “alter or abolish” provisions that had once existed. While this 
change was not a repudiation of the principle that sovereignty lies with the 
people, it embraced the view that the vehicle for expressing this sovereignty 
had to be tempered by values of republicanism, including expansive voting 
rights and the supremacy of federal law.  
During Reconstruction, only two of the state constitutions adopted in the 
former confederacy added “alter or abolish” provisions, and all of these provi-
sions—both the newly added and the preexisting clauses—were qualified in 
favor of federal power and extensive protection of individual rights.218 Some 
states did not have traditional “alter or abolish” provisions at the time of the 
war, but Congress nonetheless rejected their constitutions because the docu-
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ments did not adequately protect the voting rights of the emancipated slaves.219 
For example, Congress vetoed South Carolina’s 1865 constitution on these 
grounds, but approved a revised constitution three years later that was much 
more conciliatory towards voting rights.220 Unlike the 1865 constitution, the 
1868 constitution gave the people the right to “at all times . . . modify their 
form of government,”221 but subject to the caveat that “[n]o power, civil or mil-
itary, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of vot-
ing in this State.”222 
Like South Carolina, the Alabama constitution of 1868 gave its citizens the 
right to “change,” but not abolish the government.223 Under its 1819 constitu-
tion, the people had retained “a right to alter, reform, or abolish their form of 
government, in such manner as they may think expedient.”224 This document 
similarly provided that “[e]very white male person of the age of twenty one 
years, or upwards, who shall be a citizen of the United States, and shall have 
resided in this State one year next proceeding an election, and the last three 
months within the county, city, or town in which he offers to vote, shall be 
deemed a qualified elector.”225 The 1868 constitution changed these require-
ments by eliminating the race restriction, reducing the residency requirement to 
six months instead of a year,226 and adding a requirement that all electors, prior 
to registering to vote, take an oath to “support and maintain the Constitution and 
laws of the United States”; “never countenance or aid in the secession of this 
State from the United States”; and “accept the civil and political equality of all 
men.”227 
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Arkansas’s 1868 constitution contained a provision that allowed citizens 
to alter or reform government, but it limited their ability to dissolve their con-
nection with or rebel against the federal government.228 In contrast, its 1836 
and 1864 constitutions gave the people an unqualified right to “alter or abol-
ish” government at will.229 Arkansas’s 1836 constitution also provided “[t]hat 
all elections shall be free and equal,” 230 and granted voting rights to “[e]very 
free white male citizen . . . who shall have attained the age of twenty-one 
years, and who shall have been a citizen of this State six months.”231 Like Ala-
bama, these criteria were expanded in 1868 to eliminate the race requirement 
and exclude former confederates from voting and holding office.232 
Texas’s 1836 constitution likewise granted the right to vote to every citi-
zen, defined as “all free white persons,”233 “who has attained the age of twen-
ty-one years and shall have resided six month within the district or county 
where the election is held.”234 However, the right to vote described in its 1869 
constitution was more expansive than its predecessor: 
Every male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one 
years and upwards, not laboring under the disabilities named in this 
Constitution, without distinction of race, color or former condition, 
who shall be a resident of this State at the time of the adoption of 
this Constitution, or who shall thereafter reside in this State one 
year, and in the county in which he offers to vote sixty days next 
preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote for all officers that 
are now, or hereafter may be elected by the people, and upon all 
questions submitted to the electors at any election . . . .235 
This section is markedly different than the suffrage provision of the 1866 Texas 
constitution rejected by Congress, which limited voting to “[e]very free male 
person” rather than “[e]very male citizen.”236 The 1866 Texas constitution also 
did not disenfranchise former confederates,237 and it retained the same broad 
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“alter or abolish” language as its 1836 counterpart.238 In addition to more expan-
sive voting rights and penalties for former confederates, the 1869 constitution 
eliminated the “alter or abolish” provision, adding a preamble to the bill of rights 
that stated, “That the heresies of nullification and secession, which brought the 
country to grief, may be eliminated from future political discussion.”239 
Florida also had an “alter or abolish” provision in its constitution at the 
time of secession,240 but it amended this provision in 1868 to subordinate the 
people’s “alter or abolish” power to “the paramount allegiance of every citi-
zen” to the federal government, and circumscribe the ability of the people “to 
dissolve their connection therewith.”241 Like Arkansas, the 1838 Florida con-
stitution provided for “free and equal” elections, extending the vote to every 
“[e]very free white male person of the age of twenty-one years and upwards” 
who was a U.S. citizen, but subject to a longer residency requirement of “two 
years next preceding the election at which he shall offer to vote.”242 Florida 
attempted to retain the “alter or abolish” language from its 1838 constitution in 
the document submitted to Congress in 1865 as a condition of readmission, but 
Congress rejected it.243 Notably, the rejected 1865 constitution retained its pre-
decessor’s voting qualifications, limiting suffrage to free white males.244 The 
1868 constitution was significantly more inclusive, extending voting rights to 
“[e]very male person of the age of twenty-one years . . . of whatever race, col-
or, nationality, or previous condition, who shall . . . be a citizen,” and it re-
duced the residency requirement from two years to one year.245 
Some states reintroduced “alter or abolish” provisions in the 1870s, but 
these provisions were qualified by an expectation that the people would use 
political power, rather than violence, to change government.246 For exam-
ple, Texas amended its constitution in 1876, reinstating its “alter or abolish” 
provision, but subject to “the preservation of a republican form of govern-
ment” rather than the inalienable “right to alter, reform, or abolish their 
government” that had existed under the 1836 constitution.247 Similarly, 
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Tennessee kept its “alter or abolish” provision in both its 1835 and 1870 
constitutions, but its 1870 constitution specifically limited the circumstanc-
es in which this power could be exercised to majoritarian political process-
es: 
The Legislature shall have the right, at any time by law, to submit to 
the people the question of calling a Convention to alter, reform or 
abolish this Constitution, and when upon such submission, a majori-
ty of all the votes cast shall be in favor of said proposition, then del-
egates shall be chosen, and the Convention shall assemble in such 
mode and manner as shall be prescribed.248 
The constitutional provisions guaranteeing free and fair elections also be-
came significantly more elaborate in the post-Civil War era, further signaling a 
qualification of the “alter or abolish” authority.249 In 1874, Arkansas reinstitut-
ed the “alter or abolish” provision that existed in its 1836 and 1864 constitu-
tions, giving citizens the right to “alter, reform or abolish . . . [government] in 
such manner as they may think proper,”250 yet this right was qualified by an 
expansive requirement of free elections: 
Elections shall be free and equal. No power, civil or military, shall 
ever interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage; 
nor shall any law be enacted, whereby the right to vote at any elec-
tion shall be made to depend upon any previous registration of the 
elector’s name; or whereby such right shall be impaired or forfeited, 
except for the commission of a felony at common law, upon lawful 
conviction thereof.251 
Even the “alter or abolish” provisions adopted in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century were shadows of the provisions that had existed prior 
to the Civil War.252 Mississippi, for example, removed its “alter or abolish” 
                                                                                                                           
 248 TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1870). The 1835 constitution, although it contained an alter or 
abolish provision similar to the 1870 version, did not provide a vehicle for abolishing the constitution 
through official means. See TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1835) (including a process for amending, but 
not abolishing, the constitution). 
 249 See S.C. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1868); see also Douglas, supra note 14, at 103 (“Although the 
terms ‘free and equal’ or ‘free and open’ might seem amorphous, several state courts have construed 
this language as guaranteeing all eligible voters access to the ballot.”). 
 250 ARK. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1874); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1864); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2 
(1836). 
 251 ARK. CONST. art. III, § 2 (1874). 
 252 For example, the Oklahoma constitution of 1907 provided that people have a right to “alter or 
reform” (not to abolish) their governments, and further, “such change shall not be repugnant to the 
Constitution of the United States.” OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1907). The 1865 Missouri constitution 
also kept the alter or abolish provision from its 1820 constitution, but it added that “every such right 
should be exercised in pursuance of law, and consistently with the Constitution of the United States,” 
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provision after the Civil War.253 It was reinserted in the 1890 constitution, and 
is still a part of the state constitution today; however, like Florida and Texas, 
Mississippi’s citizens can only exercise the “alter or abolish” power if such 
action does not violate the U.S. Constitution.254 
More recently, voters have relied on their “alter or abolish” authority to 
support various iterations of direct democracy.255 In 1945, the Georgia Su-
preme Court held that the people could directly approve a new constitution 
submitted to them by the General Assembly even if the document was not cre-
ated in accordance with the formal procedures in the constitution.256 The court 
held that the state constitution gave the people the “inherent, sole and exclu-
sive right to regulate their internal government and the policy thereof, and of 
altering and abolishing their Constitution whenever it may be necessary to 
their safety and happiness,” a power that could not be superseded by those sec-
tions of the constitution requiring formal amendment through a constitutional 
                                                                                                                           
MO. CONST. art. I, § 5. (1865), and it included very specific processes by which the constitution could 
be amended or altered by majoritarian processes. Id. art. XII, § 3. 
 253 The Mississippi constitution of 1832, in effect at the time of secession, read: 
That all political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded 
on their authority, and established for their benefit, and, therefore they have at all times 
an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter or abolish their form of government, in 
such manner as they may think expedient. 
MISS. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1832). After the Civil War, that provision was removed and another provi-
sion was added, specifically declaring the state would never secede from the union: 
The right to withdraw from the Federal Union on account of any real or supposed 
grievances shall never be assumed by this State, nor shall any law be passed in deroga-
tion of the paramount allegiance of the citizens of this State to the Government of the 
United States. 
MISS. CONST. art. I, § 20 (1868). 
 254 The Mississippi constitution in effect today, the Constitution of 1890, has an “alter or abolish” 
provision. The power to abolish, however, is conditioned on such an action being allowed by the U.S. 
Constitution: 
The people of this state have the inherent, sole, and exclusive right to regulate the inter-
nal government and police thereof, and to alter and abolish their constitution and form 
of government whenever they deem it necessary to their safety and happiness; provided, 
such change be not repugnant to the constitution of the United States. 
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 6 (1890). In addition, the anti-withdrawal clause remains: 
The right to withdraw from the Federal Union on account of any real or supposed 
grievance, shall never be assumed by this State, nor shall any law be passed in deroga-
tion of the paramount allegiance of the citizens of this State to the government of the 
United States. 
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 7 (1890). 
 255 See Wheeler v. Bd. of Trs. of Fargo Consol. Sch. Dist., 37 S.E.2d 322, 329–30 (Ga. 1946); 
Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966). 
 256 Wheeler, 37 S.E.2d at 329–30 (holding that the formal amendment procedures in the state 
constitution were not exclusive because this interpretation would subvert the rights of the people). 
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convention.257 Because the new constitution was adopted by popular vote, the 
court treated it as “a valid and legal expression of the will of the people.”258 
Similarly, in 1966, Kentucky voters also relied on their constitutional authority 
to “alter or abolish” their government as a legal basis for changing the state 
constitution through direct democracy, rather than through the formal amend-
ment procedures established in their state constitution.259 This use of the power 
as a basis for democratic action, rather than violence, signaled its complete 
evolution from its Revolutionary War origins.260 
IV. THE VOTER QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSE IN ACTION: ASSESSING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE ELECTION LAWS 
By defining the substantive content of federal voting rights by reference 
to state constitutional law and the democratic norms that existed therein, vot-
ing has become a vehicle for expressing popular sovereignty like the right to 
“alter or abolish” government before it. For this reason, one could argue that 
Article I’s incorporation of the substantive law and political norms of the 
states, virtually all of which treat the right to vote in state elections as a fun-
damental right, makes the right to vote in federal elections fundamental by 
transitive property. However, this Article stops short of advancing that claim 
because, regardless if one thinks that federal political participation is funda-
mental, its dependency on state law requires that courts be more attentive to 
state rules of participation.261 
                                                                                                                           
 257 Id. at 329. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Gatewood, 403 S.W.2d at 719. 
 260 See, e.g., FRITZ, supra note 156, at 246–76 (discussing the debates over the people’s authority 
to change the state constitution outside of existing law in the context of the rebellion in Rhode Island 
in the 1840s). In Luther v. Borden, the Supreme Court conceded the existence of the “alter or abolish” 
power, but did not definitely resolve whether this authority legitimately can be exercised through 
violence. See 48 U.S. 1, 45–47 (1849) (finding that the actions taken by Rhode Island officials under 
martial law were justified). 
 261 Assuming that the Court is right and Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution encompasses 
a fundamental right to vote in federal elections, then this provision can also stand as a source of the 
right to vote in state elections because of the link between state and federal voter qualifications. Nev-
ertheless, even if the right to vote is not fundamental under Article I, the connection between the right 
to vote in federal elections and state political participation limits the states’ ability to retract the right 
to vote. Moreover, the connection between voting and the state alter or abolish provisions further 
limits the states’ authority to circumscribe the right. To the extent that the Equal Protection Clause 
remains the provision that the Supreme Court looks to as the “source” of the right to vote in state 
elections, the Court has to account for the other constitutional provisions, including the Voter Qualifi-
cations Clause of Article I, that bear on the question of what is the appropriate level of scrutiny that 
courts should use to assess state regulations of the right to vote. See Tolson, supra note 117 (arguing 
that the right to vote in state elections has several different sources, including the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments and the Guarantee Clause, which reflects that, over time, the nature of the right has 
changed depending on the historical circumstances). 
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At the very least, the analysis herein suggests that the Supreme Court’s 
balancing test has to be reformulated to allow courts to weigh the interests of 
both the voters and the state from the baseline assumption that these interests 
have similar grounding in the constitutional text and history. Under this ap-
proach, electoral changes instituted through constitutional amendment would 
enjoy a rebuttable presumption of constitutionality, but regulations adopted 
through ordinary legislation would be subject to heightened scrutiny.262 Never-
theless, the shortcomings of the balancing approach do not necessarily validate 
a strict scrutiny approach in all contexts.263 Across the board application of 
strict scrutiny could obscure the considerable authority that states retain over 
elections, but this Article shows that a higher standard of review is more ap-
propriate than the extreme deference that the Court currently gives to the states 
in assessing voter qualification standards.264 
Voter qualification requirements predate the union, and have much to tell 
us about the states’ authority over elections under Article I, Section 2. For ex-
ample, the 1843 Rhode Island constitution had extensive requirements for 
those seeking to vote in its elections, including criteria based on age, residency, 
property ownership, and proper registration.265 Other states’ constitutions, in-
cluding those written during the Revolution and revised in the early decades of 
the founding, were less specific, declaring only that all elections “be free” and 
that all men be able to participate so long as they have a sufficient interest in 
                                                                                                                           
 262 See supra notes 117–148 and accompanying text (discussing The Federalist No. 52, in which 
Madison argued that Article I limits the ability of states and the federal government to alter voter 
qualifications through ordinary legal processes because state constitutional law is the source of the 
right to vote); see also Joshua Douglas, (Mis)Trusting the States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (conceding the power that states have to choose the qualifications of electors 
because of Article I, Section 2, but arguing that this power is not “limitless” because “various other 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution cabin this state power to dictate the qualifications of voters”). 
 263 Cf. Douglas, supra note 262 (arguing that “the Court should adopt a test akin to strict scrutiny 
for restrictions on the right to vote and should require both Congress and states to justify its laws with 
specific, particularized rationales for what the law is trying to achieve”). While I agree with Professor 
Douglas’s assessment of what strict scrutiny should look like—where the Court requires actual evi-
dence to support a particular state interest—the reality is that strict scrutiny, as it has developed in the 
Court’s caselaw, has tended to lead to the automatic invalidation of the challenged provision. See 
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing 
strict scrutiny as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”). There has been a recent discussion in the aca-
demic literature about whether strict scrutiny is softening, but generally speaking, cases sustaining a 
state law under strict scrutiny are rare. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 747, 755 n.61 (2011) (arguing that cases applying strict scrutiny and upholding the challenged 
law “remain the exceptions that prove the rule of general invalidation”). 
 264 See Tolson, supra note 106, at 394 (arguing that the Court’s congruent and proportional analy-
sis, used to assess congressional legislation passed under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, has 
to account for both the sovereignty that states retain over elections and the considerable authority that 
Congress has under section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate voting rights). 
 265 See R.I. CONST., art. 2 §§ 1–2 (1842). 
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the community.266 Like Rhode Island, however, it was common for some state 
constitutions to include restrictions based on age, residency, citizenship and 
property ownership.267 As Part III shows, these requirements have loosened 
considerably over the past two centuries, with most states eliminating freehold 
requirements in the nineteenth century, and court decisions and constitutional 
amendments eradicating others by the 1960s. However, many voter qualifica-
tion requirements remain, and are assumed to be constitutional under current 
precedent.268 While this Article does not challenge the general validity of voter 
qualification requirements, this Part focuses on two standards in particular—
voter identification laws and proof of citizenship requirements—in order to 
illustrate what “heightened scrutiny” requires, consistent with the Voter Quali-
fications Clause of Article I.269 
 
A. Reassessing the Validity of Voter Identification Laws  
Under Heightened Scrutiny 
Given the states’ broad authority to impose voter qualifications, most litiga-
tion strategies challenging voter identification laws on constitutional grounds 
initially focused on equating voter identification to other disfavored qualification 
methods—namely, the poll tax—rather than assessing their validity standing 
alone.270 In Crawford v. Marion County, the Supreme Court rejected the poll tax 
                                                                                                                           
 266 See, e.g., N.C. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § VI (1776); PA. CONST. (1776). 
 267 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VII (1777). The New York Constitution of 1777 provided:  
That every male inhabitant of full age, who shall have personally resided within one of 
the counties of this State for six months immediately preceding the day of election, 
shall, at such election, be entitled to vote for representatives of the said county in as-
sembly; if, during the time aforesaid, he shall have been a freeholder, possessing a free-
hold of the value of twenty pounds, within the said county, or have rented a tenement 
therein of the yearly value of forty shillings, and been rated and actually paid taxes to 
this State. 
Id. 
 268 See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1978) (rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ claim that they had a right to vote in municipal elections since they lived outside of the city 
boundaries and therefore were not bona fide residents); Chasan v. Vill. Dist. of Eastman, 523 A.2d 16, 
24–25 (N.H. 1986) (same); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 
(1969) (challenging the requirements that residents had to own or lease taxable property in the district 
or be parents of children enrolled in public school in order to vote in school district elections, but not 
the age, citizenship, or residency requirements); Gaunt v. Brown, 341 F. Supp. 1187, 1189 (S.D. Ohio 
1972), aff’d, 409 U.S. 809 (holding that seventeen year olds who would turn eighteen by the election 
had no right to vote in primary elections); Chesser v. Buchanan, 568 P.2d 39, 41 (Colo. 1977) (con-
cluding that the right to vote for district commissioners could be restricted to property tax-payers 
under Colorado law). 
 269 See infra notes 270–306 and accompanying text.  
 270 None of this analysis precludes a successful challenge of a voter identification law on state 
constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. 2012) (remanding 
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analogy, upholding Indiana’s voter identification law on the grounds that the 
plaintiffs had not shown that the law is a severe burden on the right to vote.271 To 
the extent that the law unduly impacts some voters, the Court noted that this 
burden is mitigated by the fact that individuals can cast provisional ballots and 
obtain free identification.272 
While validating the use of voter identification laws, Crawford did not re-
solve the issue of whether some variations of these laws can pose a more se-
vere burden on the right to vote than others.273 In the years since the decision, 
states have become more restrictive in the types of identification that are ac-
ceptable for use at the polls,274 a factor that might not raise concerns if as-
sessed under equal protection, Burdick/Crawford-style balancing, but would 
raise concerns under heightened scrutiny. Heightened scrutiny would require 
that the state come forward with nonpartisan, empirical or evidentiary support 
for the law as opposed to mere assertions of the state interest at stake.275 
Functionally, what this means is that even if a state does not have a voter 
identification law, it is not prohibited from adopting one if the law is designed to 
address a specific, documented problem. For example, voter fraud was a promi-
                                                                                                                           
the case to the lower court for further consideration of whether alternate identification was sufficiently 
available to avoid massive disenfranchisement during the 2012 election in violation of the Pennsylva-
nia constitution); Pulaski Cnty. Election Comm’n v. Ark. State Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 60CV-14-
1019, 2014 WL 2925806, at *1 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Apr. 24, 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 437 
S.W.3d 80 (Ark. 2014) (invalidating Arkansas’s voter identification requirement because the law adds 
additional qualifications for voting that are not contained in the Arkansas Constitution). Consistent 
with Article I, state law should also drive analysis of federal constitutional claims. See supra notes 
117–148 and accompanying text. 
 271 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008). 
 272 Id. at 199. In addition to accepting various federal and state issued identifications for voter 
registration, Indiana’s law offered voters the option of obtaining state issued identification free of 
charge. Voters who could not obtain the identification could cast a provisional ballot and had ten days 
to bring a valid photo identification to the local election office. IND. CODE § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b). Individ-
uals can also sign an affidavit if they cannot afford identification or have a religious objection to being 
photographed. Id. 
 273 Arguably, the Court did not have to resolve this issue because Indiana’s voter identification 
law was one of the most stringent in the nation at the time. See Michael J. Pitts & Matthew D. Neu-
mann, Documenting Disenfranchisement: Voter Identification During Indiana’s 2008 General Elec-
tion, 25 J.L. & POL. 329, 332 (2009). 
 274 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163–166.11 (2013); South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 
30, 43–44 (D.D.C. 2012).  
 275 This assessment must be made even if the new law is a constitutional amendment enacted 
pursuant to voter initiative rather than ordinary legislation enacted by the legislature. Compare Purcell 
v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curium) (vacating the decision of the Ninth Circuit enjoining a 
ballot initiative that required voters to show proof of citizenship in registering to vote and photo iden-
tification when voting), with Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736–37 
(1964) (invalidating a redistricting plan on equal protection grounds, despite its adoption by popular 
referendum, because “[a] citizen’s constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply because a ma-
jority of the people choose that it be”). Less evidence would be required to defend state constitutional 
amendments under this approach because these laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality that 
ordinary legislation does not. 
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nent feature of the 2004 gubernatorial election in Washington state, where the 
election was decided by a 133-vote margin and the superior court determined 
that felons, unregistered, and deceased voters cast 1678 illegal ballots.276 Wash-
ington would be well within its authority to adopt a voter identification law in 
light of its documented history of voter fraud. In contrast, Wisconsin’s voter 
identification law, recently invalidated by a federal judge, was difficult to justify 
given that there had not been any voter impersonation in recent Wisconsin elec-
tions.277 The Wisconsin law did not further the state’s interest in election integri-
ty because the risk of fraud was speculative rather than actual. 
However, if the state asserts an interest in combating the perception of, ra-
ther than actual, fraud (which the Supreme Court has endorsed as legitimate), 
the state can further this interest with a limited voter identification law that 
avoids unduly burdening voting rights.278 In this situation, the law must have a 
minimal effect on the electorate’s composition relative to the psychic benefits 
that the state hopes to derive from the law.279  
For example, South Carolina enacted a more stringent voter identification 
law than its predecessor in 2011, Act R54 (“R54”), in order to “deter voter fraud 
and enhance public confidence in the electoral system,” despite the fact that the 
record contained no evidence of actual fraud.280 Nevertheless, the district court 
upheld the law because, as compared to other states, “South Carolina’s [voter 
identification law] would fall on the less stringent end.”281 Notably, R54 contains 
                                                                                                                           
 276 H.R. REP. NO. 109-666, at 7 & n.16 (2006) (citing Transcript of Oral Decision, Borders v. 
King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 6, 2005), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.
edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/oraldecision.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H7V7-L9NN. 
 277 The Seventh Circuit later reversed the district court decision. See Frank v. Walker, No. 11-
CV-01128, 2014 WL 1775432, at *10–17 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 29, 2014), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 
2014) (invalidating Wisconsin’s voter identification law under the U.S. Constitution and the Voting 
Rights Act). But see League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 851 
N.W.2d 302 (Wis. 2014) (upholding Wisconsin’s voter identification law on the grounds that the time 
and inconvenience associated with obtaining identification were not severe burdens on the right to 
vote). 
 278 See Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867, 876 (Alaska 2010) (noting that Alaska’s voter identifi-
cation requirement can be waived if “the voter is known to the official”). Scholars have criticized the 
Court’s reliance on “appearance of fraud” as an interest that must be balanced against the interests of 
disenfranchised voters. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 5 (2007). 
 279 See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 634 (2007) (“While a small 
amount of voter fraud hypothetically could determine a close election, the exclusion of twenty million 
Americans who lack photo identification could erroneously skew a larger number of elections.”); see 
also Frank, 2014 WL 1775432, at *9 (requiring the defendants to produce empirical support for their 
contention that the voter identification law protects the public’s confidence in the integrity of elec-
tions). 
 280 South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 43–44 (D.D.C. 2012) (“South Carolina’s 
goals of preventing voter fraud and increasing electoral confidence are legitimate and cannot be 
deemed pretextual merely because of an absence of recorded incidents of in-person voter fraud in 
South Carolina.”). 
 281 Id. at 46. 
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a “reasonable impediment provision” that is more protective of the right to vote 
than the usual affidavit and provisional ballot option, and is a holdover from 
South Carolina’s prior voter identification law that was enacted in 1988.282 The 
reasonable impediment provision requires election officials to count the ballots 
of voters who present a previously acceptable non-photo form of identification 
and sign affidavits stating their reason for not having acceptable identification.283 
When the district court considered whether R54 should be pre-cleared under sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act in October of 2012, the three-judge panel found 
that the reasonable impediment provision made R54 flexible enough that it was 
nonretrogressive and did not abridge minority voting rights.284 While the court 
erroneously credited the state’s interests without requiring evidentiary support of 
their validity (consistent with Supreme Court precedent), the court rightly recog-
nized that states can advance these purported interests through more flexible and 
less stringent voter identification laws in order to avoid abridging the right to 
vote (consistent with heightened scrutiny).285 
In contrast, North Carolina’s voter identification law is an amalgamation 
of all of the issues that would not survive heightened scrutiny: voters can pre-
sent only limited forms of identification; provisional voting is burdensome; the 
law was passed for partisan reasons; and the law is significantly less democrat-
ic than the prior regulations.286 Prior to the adoption of its omnibus election 
bill, House Bill 589, North Carolina required voters to state their name and 
address, and then sign a poll book.287 The new law is significantly more strin-
gent than the prior rule.288 House Bill 589 provides that North Carolina voters 
must present an unexpired form of acceptable photo identification such as a 
passport or identification issued by the US military or Department of Veterans 
Affairs, a federally—or North Carolina—recognized tribe, or another state if 
                                                                                                                           
 282 Id. at 33, 35. 
 283 Id. at 41 (“The reasonable impediment provision thus operates similarly to a requirement that 
the voter without photo ID simply sign an affidavit stating that the voter is who he or she says.”). 
 284 Id. at 39. 
 285 Id. at 48 (“[O]ur comparison of South Carolina’s Act R54 to some other States’ voter ID 
laws—as well as to the Carter-Baker Report’s proposed voter ID reforms—strongly buttresses the 
conclusion that . . . South Carolina’s new voter ID law is significantly more friendly to voters without 
qualifying photo IDs than several other contemporary state laws that have passed legal muster.”); see 
also id. at 39 (noting that “as compared to pre-existing South Carolina law, Act R54 expands the list 
of photo IDs that will qualify for voting”). 
 286 While North Carolina’s voter identification law does not go into effect until 2016, House Bill 
589 does not count provisional ballots filed by individuals who vote at the wrong precinct starting in 
2014. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163–166.11 (2013). Under the prior law, North Carolina voters could mail, 
fax, or deliver the required identification in person in order to have their provisional ballot counted. 
See, e.g., Provisional Voting, CNTY. OF MOORE, N.C., available at http://www.moorecountync.gov/
index.php/en/election-day-information/provisional-voting, archived at http://perma.cc/GVP3-9Y6X 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2014). 
 287 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163–166.7 (2012). 
 288 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163–166.7 (2013). 
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the voter’s registration falls within 90 days of the election.289 If a voter does 
not possess proper identification on Election Day, he or she may vote provi-
sionally and return with acceptable identification before canvassing to have his 
or her provisional ballot counted.290 It is unlikely that North Carolina’s voter 
identification law would survive heightened scrutiny because the burdens on 
the electorate are not sufficiently justified by any legitimate, nonpartisan state 
interests, particularly in light of the flexibility of the prior law. Recently, a fed-
eral district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction to 
bar House Bill 589 from going into effect.291 The court applied the Bur-
dick/Crawford balancing test and found that the law would not impose a severe 
burden on the right to vote.292 Had the court applied heightened scrutiny, it 
would have closely critiqued the legislature’s reasons for imposing the election 
changes, an assessment that has been missing from most of the caselaw for 
over twenty years.293 
B. Article I and the Legitimacy of Dual Voter Registration Systems 
The debate over voter identification laws has revealed that states can im-
pose different types of voter qualification requirements, consistent with Article 
I, so long as there is evidence supporting the state’s regulatory interests. How-
ever, state laws that require individuals to produce documentary proof of citi-
zenship prior to voting have raised a novel issue of whether states can run par-
allel voter registration systems for state and federal elections if this qualifica-
tion is prohibited by federal law. The Supreme Court recently confronted a re-
lated issue in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, where it held that the 
National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”) preempted Arizona’s proof of citi-
zenship requirement that was a prerequisite for voter registration in all elec-
tions.294 The NVRA, which Congress enacted pursuant to its authority under 
the Elections Clause, provides that all states must “accept and use” a uniform 
federal form to register individuals to vote in federal elections.295 Contrary to 
                                                                                                                           
 289 See id. 
 290 See Amended Complaint, Currie v. North Carolina, No. 13-CV-001419 (Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 
2013), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/CurrieV.NC.php, archived at http://
perma.cc/3KJC-EXMF. The Currie plaintiffs also challenge the reduction of early voting days, argu-
ing that the North Carolina legislature passed the law with discriminatory purpose. The plaintiffs seek 
to enjoin HB 589 from going into effect in 2016 and are asking the court to bail North Carolina into 
preclearance under section 3(c) of the VRA. 
 291 N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 384 (M.D.N.C. 2014) 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, No. 14-
1845, 2014 WL 4852113 (4th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014). 
 292 Id. at 362–65, 369–70, 381. 
 293 For a recent exception, see Frank, 2014 WL 1775432, at *34. 
 294 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013). 
 295 National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), Pub. L. No. 103–31 § 6, 107 Stat. 77 
(1993). 
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the Arizona law, the NVRA requires that individuals attest to U.S. citizenship 
but does not demand documentary proof of citizenship.296 
On the surface, the Court’s decision is a vindication of federal authority 
by recognizing that Congress has broad power to regulate federal elections 
under the Elections Clause; in reality, the decision represents a significant limi-
tation on Congress’s ability to regulate voter qualifications. The Court rejected 
Arizona’s argument that the federal form would not allow the state to collect 
the information necessary to assess citizenship status, but the Court did so 
while agreeing with Arizona that the states, and not Congress, have plenary 
authority to prescribe voter qualifications.297 According to the Court, the Elec-
tions Clause is limited to setting the “Times, Places, and Manner of holding 
elections,” and confers no authority on Congress “to make or alter” voter qual-
ifications.298 Instead, these qualifications are linked to the state franchise by 
various provisions of the Constitution, including Article I, Section 2 and the 
Seventeenth Amendment.299 
In the wake of the decision, Arizona and Kansas moved forward with im-
posing dual voter registration systems, requiring proof of citizenship for state, 
but not federal, elections.300 In Arizona Inter Tribal, the Court read Article I to 
delegate exclusive control over voter qualifications to the states, and in the 
majority’s view, the NVRA can preempt additional requirements for voter reg-
istration only so long as the statute does not frustrate the states’ ability to exer-
cise their authority over voter qualifications.301 Nevertheless, Article I likely 
prohibits states from divorcing state and federal voter qualifications in order to 
impose more onerous requirements on those seeking to participate in state 
elections.302 As Parts II and III show, federal voting rights derive their meaning 
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from participation in state elections, making it difficult to constitutionally justi-
fy any regime that creates federal electors independent of state voter qualifica-
tions.303 
Before the dual voter registration system could be challenged in court, a 
federal district court held that the U.S. Election Assistance Commission 
(“EAC”) could not prevent Kansas and Arizona from requesting documentary 
proof of citizenship as a prerequisite for registering to vote in federal elec-
tions.304 Relying on Article I, the district court found that Arizona and Kansas 
could not properly exercise their authority over voter qualifications using the 
federal form alone.305 Notably, the court relied on the very existence of these 
state proof of citizenship laws—one of which the Supreme Court determined 
was preempted—as sufficient in and of themselves to establish that the states’ 
authority over voter qualifications was frustrated by the EAC’s refusal to allow 
them to require documentary proof of citizenship.306 
Like many election law cases, the district court opinion credited the 
states’ interest in preventing voter fraud even though, on the facts before the 
court, there was no significant evidence of noncitizen voting in any elections 
held in either state. Had the court applied heightened scrutiny, it would have 
required that the states come forward with this evidence to illustrate that feder-
al law thwarted its regulatory authority over voter qualifications. 
CONCLUSION 
The Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 makes the 
electors for the federal House of Representatives the same as the electors of the 
most numerous branch of the state legislature. This provision makes federal vot-
ing rights parasitic upon participation in state elections, and given that state elec-
tions are, and have been, highly democratic, congressional elections must also be 
highly democratic. The democratic structure of the states, best illustrated by the 
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“alter or abolish” provisions that existed in state constitutions during the found-
ing era, was integral to efforts in the nineteenth century to define the contours of 
the right to vote, and should influence the scope of authority that states have to 
regulate their elections today. During this period, the “alter or abolish” authority 
was the vehicle through which the people expressed their sovereign authority. 
After the Civil War, the Reconstruction-era Congress domesticized this authority 
by rejecting the violence inherent in the right due to its role in southern seces-
sion, and states transitioned to more peaceful expressions of the people’s sover-
eign power by implementing expansive voting rights in state constitutions. This 
history indicates that the state-friendly balancing test that the Supreme Court 
applies to electoral regulations does not reflect the Constitution’s structural pa-
thologies, which are premised on the assumption that making federal voting 
rights dependent upon state rules would result in more, not less, political partici-
pation. Consistent with Article I, courts must assess state regulations under 
heightened scrutiny in order to protect the right to vote in federal elections. 
   
 
